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Congress is currently considering several proposals for revi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Act.' One of the important changes2
advanced in the proposals3 is the redefinition of a "voidable pref-
erence." This concept, part of bankruptcy law for more than a
century, has been part of section 60 of the present Act since
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I 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1103 (1970).
The proposed Act, sponsored by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, was originally introduced in 1973. See H.R. 10792, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973); 119 CONG. REC. 33445 (1973). The Commission bill has been reintroduced, see S.
236, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONG. REC.
6467 (daily ed. April 22, 1975). A proposal supported by the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges is also before Congress. See S. 235, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R.
32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); 121 CONG. REc. S6467 (daily ed. April 22, 1975); 120
CONG. REC. H9249 (daily ed. Sept. 12, 1974). This Article principally addresses the
problems of H.R. 31. Significant differences in H.R. 32 will be mentioned in the notes.
2 For a general discussion of some of the changes embodied in the proposed Bank-
ruptcy Act, see Symposium-Bankruptcy Reform-1973, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 381 (1973).
The legislative history of the 1973 Act is recounted briefly in Cyr, The Bankruptcy Act of
1973: Back to the Drafting Board, 48 Am. BANKR. L.J. 45 (1974). For a more detailed
consideration of some of the proposed Act's most controversial sections, see, e.g., Broude,
Jurisdiction and Venue Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 Am. BANKR. L.J. 231 (1974);
Brudney, The Bankruptcy Commission's Proposed "Modifications" of the Absolute Priority Rule,
48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 305 (1974); Phelan, The Proposed Bankruptcy Administration (the
"FBA")-Bureaucratic Alphabet Soup Gets a Bigger Bowl, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341 (1974);
Twinem, Bankruptcy Report: Some Limitations on Creditors' Rights, 29 Bus. LAW. 353 (1974);
Viles, Non-Revolutionary Bankruptcy Act Proposed by the National Bankruptcy Commission, 29
Bus. LAW. 1117 (1974); Weintraub & Levin, Chapter VII (Reorganizations) As Proposed by the
National Bankruptcy Commission: The Widening Gap Between Theory And Reality, 47 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 323 (1973).
' The proposed Act is sponsored by the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the
United States, which was created by the Act ofJuly 24, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat.
468. The Commission's mandate was to "study, analyze, evaluate and recommend
changes to the [Bankruptcy] Act... in order for such Act to reflect and adequately meet
the demands of present technical, financial, and commercial activities." Id. § l(b). The
Commission submitted a report explaining its proposals. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION
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AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
1898.1 Section 60, in its present form, gives a trustee in bank-
ruptcy the power to set aside or avoid certain transfers by the
bankrupt as preferential, and to recover the transferred assets
for the benefit of the bankrupt's unsecured creditors. 5 The im-
ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess., pt. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
The Commission's proposals concerning the treatment of "voidable preferences" (§
4-607) follow closely a revision of § 60 of the present Bankruptcy Act prepared for and
accepted by the National Bankruptcy Conference. That revision was authored by the
Conference's Committee on Coordination of the Bankruptcy Act and the Uniform
Commercial Code, headed by Professor Grant Gilmore [hereinafter cited as the Gilmore
Committee or the Committee]. All references in this Article to the "draftsmen" of § 4-607
are to the Gilmore Committee. See COMinssIoN REPORT, supra, at 206. The proposal of
the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges contains a modified version of § 4-607.
4 Lord Mansfield introduced the idea of a preference or preferential transfer into
the English law of bankruptcy in Morseley v. DeMattos, 1 Burr. 467, 97 Eng. Rep. 407
(K.B. 1758). Preferences were originally conceived as a kind of fraud, see id., not unlike
the classical fraudulent transfer which had been proscribed since enactment of the
Statute against Fraudulent Deeds, 13 Eliz. c. 5 (1571). The original English rule focused
on the intent of the debtor and broadly excepted all transfers motivated by a fear of the
creditor's resort to dire process. See, e.g., Thompson v. Freeman, 1 T.R. 155, 99 Eng.
Rep. 1026 (K.B. 1786); Harman v. Fishar, 1 Cowp. 117, 98 Eng. Rep. 998 (K.B. 1774).
That rule, still the law in England, is embodied in the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914,.4
& 5 Geo. 5, c.59, § 44.
The concept of a preferential transfer entered American law in many nineteenth
century federal and state bankruptcy acts. For an account of the role played by the
concept in the state insolvency statutes that flourished during the long periods between
federal enactments, see P.J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 282 n.13
(1974). At the federal level, an explicit prohibition of preferential transfers first ap-
peared in the Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843). Under the
influence ofJustice Story, the American law of preferences gradually divorced itself from
its English predecessor. According to Story, the existence of a preference should depend
not upon the debtor's motives or state of mind, but upon his financial condition when he
made the transfer. Everett v. Stone, 8 F. Cas. 898 (No. 4577) (C.C.D. Me. 1844); Arnold
v. Maynard, I F. Cas. 1181 (No. 561) (C.C.D. Mass. 1842). If a transfer made while the
debtor was insolvent gave a creditor an advantage over co-creditors, Story argued, it
should be set aside as preferential regardless of the debtor's motive. Story's reasoning was
adopted by other courts and finally was ratified by the Supreme Court in Toof v. Martin,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 40 (1871), a case involving the preference section of the Bankruptcy
Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878). Thus, what might be called the
"objective" theory of preferences has long been accepted in American law.
Since 1898, the preference section of the Bankruptcy Act has been § 60, 11 U.S.C. §
96 (1970). Section 60 adopts the objective approach, but it contains a vestige of subjectiv-
ism in its requirement that the creditor know of his debtor's insolvency for a preference
to be voidable. See note 5 infra. The proposed Act would eliminate this last remnant
of the English approach, except in special cases that resemble the classical fraudulent
conveyance. See CoziMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 3, at 201; note 7 infra.
For a detailed discussion of the early development of the law of preference, in
England and America, see G. GLENN, 2 FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
654-59 (2d rev. ed. 1940).
5 Section 60a(1) of the Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, 64 Stat. 25, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(1)
(1970), defines a preference as:
a transfer, as defined in this Act, of any of the property of a debtor to or for the
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portance of section 60 has been recognized in recent years as it
has become "the principal conduit for discussion of the extent to
which security interests [are] (or should be) good against or
voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy.
'6
Section 4-6077 of the Act proposed by the Commission on
benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt, made or suffered
by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the filing by or
against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, the effect of
which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than some other creditor of the same class.
Section 60b of the Act of March 18, 1950, ch. 70, 64 Stat. 25, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b),
provides that "[a]ny such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiv-
ing it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the
time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent."
6 REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 CONMITTEE REPORT].
This Report was submitted to the National Bankruptcy Conference by the Gilmore
Committee in 1970, along with its final draft proposal for a revision of § 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act. A review of the Committee's work and an account of its informal
relationship with the Review Committee that had been appointed by the American Law
Institute to study suggested changes in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, may
be found in 1970 CO1 IMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 1-4.
For a more extended discussion of the emergence of § 60 as the key section for
testing the validity of security interests in bankruptcy, see G. GiUioRt, 2 SECURITY
INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 45.3.3-45.5 (1965) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
7 For convenience, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607 (1975), is reproduced here
in its entirety:
SECTION 4-607 PREFERENCES.-
(a) RIGHT TO RECOVER.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, a
trustee may recover property of the debtor transferred to pay or secure, directly
or indirectly, an antecedent debt of a creditor if the transfer occurred when the
debtor was insolvent and occurred either
(1) within three months before the date of the petition or,
(2) if the creditor was a member of the immediate family, a partner, an
affiliate, a director, an officer, or a managing agent of or for the debtor, who
had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was insolvent at the date the transfer
occurred, within the period commencing one year before and ending three
months before the date of the petition. The trustee shall have the burden of
proving insolvency and reasonable cause to believe under this paragraph.
(b) ExCEPTIONS: TRANSFERS OF SMALL AMiOUNTS; STATUTORY LIENS;
NONPREFERENTIAL EFFECTS.-The trustee may not avoid a transfer under this
section if-
(1) the aggregate value of all property so transferred to a creditor other
than a member of the immediate family, a partner, an affiliate, a director, an
officer, or a managing agent of or for the debtor, is less than $1,000;
(2) the transfer is a statutory or common-law lien not invalid under section
4-606 or is a transfer in satisfaction of such a lien; or
(3) the result of the transfer, tested as of the date of the petition, does not
enable the creditor benefited to obtain a greater percentage of his claim than
other creditors of the same class and there are no unpaid creditors of a higher
class.
(c) EXCEPTIONS: ENABLING LOANS; SUBSEQUENT ADVANCES.-
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States defines the concept of
a preference and specifies which preferences are voidable by the
bankrupt's trustee. Accepting as a fait accompli the use of the
voidable preference as a device for testing the validity of security
(1) A security interest in property acquired by the debtor, if perfected
when the debtor first acquires rights in the property or within ten days there-
after, is not voidable under this section to the extent that it secures new value
previously given to enable the debtor to acquire the property. In determining
the amount of new value given for such security interest, the value of any other
security taken for it shall be deducted.
(2) A transfer is not voidable to the extent of new value given at the time of
the transfer or at any time thereafter. In determining the amount of new value
given, the value of any security taken for it shall be deducted.
(d) ExCEPTION: RECEIVABLES AND INVENTORY.-If inventory was acquired
or receivables arose and became collateral covered by a security agreement, a
perfected transfer of such inventory or receivables or the proceeds of either is
not voidable except to the extent that the transferee has improved his position
by an increase in the value of the security at the expense of the estate. The
transferee has so improved his position if-
(1) the debt secured exceeds the aggregate value of all security for the debt
three months before the filing of the petition or, if new value was first given
under the security agreement during the three month period, on the date new
value was first given; and
(2) the amount by which the debt exceeded the value of the security has
been reduced or eliminated by the date of the petition. The trustee shall have
the burden of proving an improvement in position by an increase in the value of
security at the expense of the estate and the extent thereof.
(e) INDEMNIFYING TRANSFERS.-A trustee may recover property transferred
to indemnify a surety that furnished a bond or other obligation to dissolve a lien
obtained by judicial proceedings that was voidable by the trustee under subsec-
tion (a). If the value of the indemnifying property is less than the amount for
which such property is indemnity, the surety may retain such property on pay-
ment of its value to the trustee. The liability of the surety under the releasing
bond or other obligation shall be discharged to the extent of the value of the
indemnifying property recovered by the trustee or the amount paid to the
trustee.
(f) PRESUMPTION OF INSOLVENCY.-A debtor is presumed to have been in-
solvent throughout the three-month period before the date of the petition.
(g) DErINITIONS.-For the purpose of this section, the following definitions
are applicable:
(1) The term "antecedent debt" is a debt incurred more than five days
before a transfer paying or securing the debt. The term "antecedent debt" does
not include (A) a debt for personal services, (B) a debt for utilities incurred
within three months of the petition, (C) a debt for inventory paid for within
three months of the delivery of the goods in the ordinary course of the debtor's
business, or (D) an obligation to transfer ownership arising out of a contract for
the sale of property owned by the debtor and in existence either at the date the
contract was entered into or at a time more than three months prior to the
petition.
(2) The term "inventory" means personal property leased or furnished or
held for sale or lease or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw
materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business. "Inven-
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interests in bankruptcy proceedings,8 the Committee draftsmen
have attempted in section 4-607 to set out a general formula for
determining which security interests are good in bankruptcy and
which are not.
Today, consensual security interests in personal property
are governed almost entirely by Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial CodeY The terminology of Article 9 appears to conflict,
tory" includes farm products such as crops or livestock held for sale.
(3) The term "new value" means money, or money's worth in goods, ser-
vices, or new credit, or the release by a transferee of property previously trans-
ferred to him in a transaction which is not voidable, but does not include an
obligation substituted for an existing obligation.
(4) The term "receivable" means any right to money for the transfer or use
of property or for the furnishing of services, whether or not the right has been
earned by performance.
(5) The term "security agreement" means any agreement between a debtor
and a transferee under which the transferee receives or retains, or is to receive
or retain, an interest in property or preceeds of property to secure payment or
performance of an obligation.
(6) A transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the in-
terest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is
perfected when the transferee has acquired an interest in the property which is
superior to the rights a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the property from
the transferor could subsequently acquire by his purchase. A transfer of fixtures
or of property other than real property is perfected when the transferee has
acquired an interest in the property which is superior to the rights a subsequent
judicial lien creditor could acquire in the property transferred.
(7) A transfer occurs when it takes effect between the parties if perfected at
that time or within ten days thereafter. If perfected after the ten days, the
transfer occurs when perfection occurs. Unless perfected within ten days, a
transfer not perfected before the filing of the petition dates from a time im-
mediately preceding such filing. A transfer does not take effect before the
transferor has acquired rights in the property.
Preferences are also dealt with in H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607 (1975).
8 Originally, the Gilmore Committee contemplated drafting a new section that would
state explicitly which security interests were valid in bankruptcy, in what order, and to
what extent. See REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as 1967 COMMITTEE REPORT].
This report accompanied the Committee's original redraft of § 60.
Presumably, such a section would have tracked the perfection and priority rules of
Article 9 itself. Despite the "theoretical merit" of this simplified approach, the
Committee's members believed that this solution "came too late in the day," 1970
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. Apparently, the Committee felt that lawyers,
referees, and judges had grown so accustomed to analyzing the validity of security in-
terests in the conceptual idiom of fraudulent conveyances and voidable preferences, that
a fresh approach substituting a set of straightforward rules delimiting the protection to
be accorded security interests in bankruptcy for the roundabout and highly metaphysical
manipulation of the ideas of fraud and preference, would do more harm than good. The
Committee concluded that "[t]his accumulated and encrusted burden of history was ...
too heavy to be sloughed off." 1970 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 1, and decided to
attack the security interest problem by revising § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
9 Article 9 is meant to be a comprehensive statute governing the creation and protec-
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
however, with the conceptual framework of section 60, which
was last fully revised in 1950, before Article 9 had become the
law in any state.10 Therefore, the precise status in bankruptcy of
certain Article 9 security interests has remained unclear and has
generated substantial controversy." The warmest controversy
has surrounded the Article 9 "floating lien"'12 which expressly
tion of consensual security interests in chattel property. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
9-102. At least some interests, however, are explicitly excluded from the Article's cover-
age. See, e.g., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-104(a) (interests which arise or attach
pursuant to a statute of the United States). For an analysis of the reasons for the special
exceptions contained in § 9-104, see I GILMORE, supra note 6, § 10.7. Besides interests
specifically excluded from Article 9 coverage, there are certain "peripheral" security
interests whose inclusion under Article 9 is not unambiguously certain. As a result, the
precise scope of Article 9 continues to be debatable. See Coogan, Leases of Equipment and
Some Other Unconventional Security Devices: An Analysis of UCC Section 1-201(37) and Article
9, 1973 DUKE L.J. 909; Stroh, Peripheral Security Interests-The Expanded Net of Article 9, 22
MIAMI L. REV. 67 (1967); Symposium-Subordination and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23
Bus. LAW. 33 (1967); cf. Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 505 (1964) (analysis of the "negative mortgage"); Reichman, The Anti-Lien: Another
Security Interest in Land, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 685 (1974).
10 The most dramatic conflict between Article 9 and § 60 is a function of their
incommensurable conceptions of 'perfection." See text accompanying note 59 infra. It is
also difficult to reconcile the continuing prohibition of the so-called "equitable lien" in §
60a(6) with Article 9's total abolition of such liens; or the "grace period" allowed by §
60a(7) with the absence of any comparable grace period under Article 9 (with the excep-
tion of purchase money security interests, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-301(2), and
certain nonpossessory security interests in. instruments and documents, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-304(4)). These and other anomalies exist not because Article 9
and § 60 take consciously different approaches to basic problems of policy, but because
the two statutes were drafted in "different universes of discourse," 2 GILMORE supra note
6, § 45.7, at 1320.
For an excellent recent exploration of the Article 9-Bankruptcy relationship, see
Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974
Wis. L. REV. 925.
11 See text accompanying notes 31 & 32 infra.
12 The provisions of Article 9 about which discussion of the floating lien centers
include those which permit the debtor (a) to hypothecate any or all of his
personal property, including after-acquired property, the lien on the property
following over into "products" into which it is wrought or commingled, or "pro-
ceeds" resulting from its disposition; (b) to give present security for future
advances; (c) to use with respect to any kind of collateral the "notice filing"
heretofore restricted to inventory and accounts receivable; and (d) to exercise
such dominion or control over the collateral as may be agreed upon between the
parties.
Coogan, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured Creditors and the
"Floating Lien," 72 HARv. L. REv. 838, 839-40 (1959) (footnotes omitted). See also 1
GILMORE, supra note 6, § 11.7.
The term "floating lien" is used in this Article to refer in a narrower and more
specific sense to Article 9's validation of security interests in after-acquired property. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-204(1) [9-204(3) (1962 version)], 9-108. This aspect of
the "floating lien," more than any other, has occasioned doubts about the validity in
bankruptcy of Article 9 security interests in inventory and receivables. See text accom-
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validates a security interest in after-acquired inventory and
receivables. 13 During the 1960's and early 1970's, the validity of
this floating lien in bankruptcy proceedings was challenged, in
law reviews 14 and in the courts. 15
A primary goal of the draftsmen of section 4-607 was to
clarify exactly the limits within which a security interest in after-
acquired inventory or receivables is valid in bankruptcy. 16 The
description of these limits proved to be, by the draftsmen's own
admission,' 7 their most difficult problem. Their solution is con-
tained primarily in subsection (d) of the proposed Act's section
4-607.' 8
The aim of this Article is to explore the shortcomings of
section 4-607(d), and to suggest ways in which the subsection
might be improved to further its basic objective: a "resolution of
the conflicting interests of secured and unsecured creditors in
the disaster of bankruptcy which, although it might wholly
satisfy neither group, might nevertheless be accepted by both
groups as a reasonably satisfactory compromise."' 9 Before the
shortcomings of section 4-607(d) are canvassed, it is necessary to
understand the background against which the section was
drafted.
panying notes 31 & 32 infra. Of course, the bankruptcy consequences of other aspects of
the Article 9 "floating lien" (and, in particular, of the "proceeds" provisions of § 9-306)
have not gone unnoticed. See, e.g., Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75
CoM. L.J. 269, 271-75 (1970); Gillombardo, The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code
Proceeds in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of Section 9-306, 38 U. CINN. L. RaV. 1 (1969);
Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 232 (1965);
Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Some Problems
Suggested by Articles 2 and 9, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 518, 531-34 (1960).
'3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1) [9-204(3) (1962 version)] & Comment 3.
14 See notes 31-67 infra & accompanying text.
15 See notes 68-76 infra & accompanying text.
16 See 1970 COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 5-7, 15-17. The Gilmore Committee
considered the problem of the status of security interests in after-acquired inventory and
receivables of paramount importance. They considered the provision that became the
predecessor of § 4-607(d) "the heart of the matter. It deals with the only problem in the
relationship between present § 60 and Article 9 which has, so far, generated not only
literary controversy but a substantial amount of litigation." Id. 15-16.
' "The most difficult problem which the Committee has wrestled with during the
several years of its labors has been the appropriate treatment of so-called revolving credit
arrangements secured by inventory and receivables," 1970 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 6, at 2.
18 H.R. 31, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. § 4-607 (1975), is reproduced at note 7 supra.
19 1970 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 1. See generally text accompanying notes
102-105 infra.
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I. THE BACKGROUND OF SECTION 4-607(d)
Section 9-204(1)2o of the Uniform Commercial Code states
that with certain specified exceptions, "a security agreement may
provide that any or all obligations covered by the security
agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral." The
comments to section 9-204 report that the purpose of the provi-
sion is to validate "what has been variously called the floating
charge, the free-handed mortgage and the lien on a shifting
stock."
2'
In the pre-Code period, security interests in after-acquired
property received varying, but generally unfavorable, judicial
treatment.2 2 The Code's Official Comment points out:
The widespread nineteenth century prejudice against
the floating charge was based on a feeling, often inar-
ticulate in the opinions, that a commercial borrower
should not be allowed to encumber all his assets present
and future, and that for the protection not only of the
borrower but of his other creditors a cushion of free
assets should be preserved.
23
20 The language of§ 9-204(1) of the Code, in the 1972 version, clarifies § 9-204(3) of
the 1962 version.
For a general survey and discussion of the 1972 changes, see Coogan, The New UCC
Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REv. 477 (1973).
21 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204, Comment 2; see id., Comment 1.
22 For an excellent discussion of the early history of the treatment of security in-
terests in after-acquired property, see Cohen & Gerber, The After-Acquired Property Clause,
87 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1939). Tracing the validation of security interests in future
property back to Mitchell v. Winslow, 17 F. Cas. 527 (No. 9673) (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (Story,
J.), Cohen and Gerber describe and criticize the welter of limitations on such interests,
including the so-called "equity," New York, and Massachusetts rules.
Professor Gilmore's account of the early history of the after-acquired property clause
accords with that offered by Cohen and Gerber. See 1 GILMORE, supra note 6, §§ 2.3, 2.4.
23 UNIFORM COMIMERCIAL CODE § 9-204, Comment 2; cf., e.g., Zartman v. First Nat'l
Bank, 189 N.Y. 267, 82 N.E. 127 (1907). Zartman, trustee in bankruptcy for the Water-
loo Organ Company, succeeded in invalidating the interests of the bank, holder of a
mortgage on the organ company's after-acquired personal property. While saying that
equity would in certain circumstances enforce such a mortgage, the court held that equity
would not aid the bank because enforcement could injure unwarned unsecured creditors.
The court's language, however, suggests a rationale for an even broader limitation on
security interests in after-acquired inventory and receivables:
The credit extended by [the mortgagor's general, unsecured creditors] enabled
the mortgagor to carry on business, and if the product of that credit [i.e., the
mortgagor's entire inventory] goes to the mortgagee, not only are they helpless,
but, if the law is so declared, hereafter manufacturing corporations needing
credit will be helpless also. If it is understood that a corporate mortgage given by
a manufacturing corporation may take everything except accounts and debts,
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Despite this judicial prejudice against security interests in after-
acquired property, the need for new sources of collateral24 led to
the development of legal devices that permitted a collateral-
starved debtor to obtain a loan secured not only by property
presently in his possession, but also by property that he would
have in the future.25 According to the draftsmen, Article 9, "in
such corporations, with a mortgage outstanding, will have to do business on a
cash basis or cease to do business altogether.
Id. at 271-72, 82 N.E. at 128.
24 "There have no doubt been sufficient economic reasons" stimulating the search
for new collateral. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204, Comment 2. Professor Gilmore
speculates about these reasons:
As industrialization progressed, personal rather than real property came to be
the principal repository of wealth. The mortgage on Blackacre would no longer
be enough to support the merchant's insatiable demand for credit and the
banker's demand for security. Nor would the medieval institution of pledge
suffice to take up the slack: share certificates and bonds could conveniently be
pledged but obviously the equipment of the factory, the rolling stock of the
railroad, the stock in trade of the merchant could not be. And yet all this
property which could not be pledged because it had to be used in the borrower's
business represented a nearly inexhaustible source of prime collateral for loans.
The story of how the equipment and the rolling stock and the stock in trade
came to be available as collateral is essentially the story of personal property
security law in the nineteenth century.
1 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 2.1, at 25.
25 Of particular importance were the Factor's Lien Acts, which were modeled closely
after the former N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 45 (McKinney 1962), 1911 L. of N.Y., c.326, §
1, as amended (repeal effective 1964), and the various accounts receivable statutes that
were enacted in the wake of Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434
(1943). That case upset non-notification accounts receivable financing arrangements.
Although Professor Gilmore cautioned that he could not confidently put forward the
conclusion that § 45 validated a floating lien arrangement, 1 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 5.4,
at 138, it has long been assumed that § 45 did, in fact, effect such a validation. Dean
Harlan Fiske Stone wrote: "This statute [i.e., the 1911 version of § 45] authorized the
creation of a general lien or floating charge upon merchandise including after-acquired
chattels, to secure the payments of advances or commissions or other charges covered by
the agreement for a lien .. " He added that the filing provisions were cumbersome and
seldom used. Stone, The "Equitable Mortgage" in New York, 20 COLUM. L. REV. 519, 532
(1920). Stone's understanding of § 45 was shared by Mr. Justice Brandeis. 1 GILMORE,
supra, at n.8; see Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 361 n.11 (1925).
For a discussion of the origin and subsequent history of the accounts receivable
statutes, see 1 GILMORE, supra, §§ 8.6-8.8. It is most important to note that
most of the statutes as they were originally drafted, were either not clear that
future claims could be presently assigned or were clear that they could not be.
Both the statutory definitions of "account" and (under filing statutes) the filing
provisions seemed to be relevant to the question: to make things a little worse,
the definitional section and the filing section sometimes seemed to point firmly
in different directions. The cases mostly held that future claims could not be
assigned-either they were not "accounts" or they were not protected by the
filing system. In several states such holdings-or the threat of them-led to
further legislative amendment; thus by the end of the period, it had become crystal-
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expressly validating the floating charge, merely recognizes an
existing state of things. 26
Although section 9-204 speaks of "after-acquired collateral"
generally and would therefore apply when the collateral is a
relatively fixed or long-term asset (such as plant equipment),27
the section's greatest impact would appear to be upon financ-
ing transactions in which the collateral is composed of assets
classified as "current" or "quick" (such as inventory or re-
ceivables).28 Current assets are by nature transient: the ongoing
life of a business enterprise requires their continuous liquida-
tion. A business holds inventory in order to sell it. In the ordi-
nary course of business, inventory is sold and transformed into
accounts receivable (or intangibles of some other sort); accounts
receivable are paid and the proceeds used in the purchase of
fresh inventory; and the entire cycle is begun again. Stagnation
at any point is usually a symptom or a cause of commercial
failure.
clear in afew jurisdictions that future claims could be presently assigned--at least if they
were statutory "accounts."
Id. § 8.7, at 280-81 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted).
26 UNIFORM COM"i ERCIAL CODE § 9-204, Comment 2.
27 See notes 155 & 156 infra & accompanying text. One of the consequences of the
case law development following Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), was the "di-
vorcement between financing on the security of long-term assets and financing on the
security of. . . 'quick assets'," 1 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 8.5, at 267. The divorcement
occurred because courts construed the Benedict holding to mean that retention by the
debtor of a power to sell or otherwise dispose freely of even a portion of the collateral
securing his creditor's claim "pervades and taints the instrument as a whole," rendering
ineffective the creditor's security interest in any of the collateral covered by the instru-
ment. See Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350, 351 (2d Cir. 1926) (L. Hand, J.). But cf. American
S.S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F.2d 886 (W.D.N.Y. 1930), aff'd per curiam, 49
F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1931).
28 The "current assets" of a business enterprise include "Cash, Receivables that will
become cash, and Inventories which at a little later date may become first Receivables and
then Cash." T. FIFLIs & H. KRiPKE, ACCOUNTING FOR BUSINESS LAWYERS 56 (1971).
Elsewhere, Professor Kripke has written:
Because of this accountant's classification and because each item of inventory
and each account receivable is itself of short duration, these types of assets are
sometimes thought of as ephemeral. . . . [But] the accountant's classification,
when we take it too literally, leads us astray and conceals from us the permanent
long-term fixed character of the investment of a business enterprise in its nor-
mal inventory and in its normal amount of accounts receivable. The enterprise
needs long-term capital for these purposes just as much as it needs long-term
capital for its plant and machinery, which the accountant recognizes as fixed
assets.
Kripke, Current Assets Financing as a Source of Long-Term Capital, 36 MINN. L. REV. 506,
510-11 (1952).
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A loan secured by volatile collateral of this type must not
impede the normal metamorphosis of assets from inventory to
receivables to cash to inventory. The debtor must be free to liq-
uidate the collateral securing the debt as his business requires; in
order to keep the debt fully secured, however, fresh collateral of
the same sort as the old collateral29 must take the latter's place
as it is liquidated. This requires a revolving collateral scheme,
which depends upon the recognition and protection of security
interests in after-acquired property. A principal aim of the Arti-
cle 9 floating lien is to provide a legal foundation for current
assets financing, that is, for financing on the basis of inventory
and receivables.
30
In the early 1960's, a considerable debate flared up, first in
the law reviews and then in the courts, 31 about the validity in
bankruptcy proceedings of the Article 9 floating lien. Those who
denied the validity of the lien argued that it rested upon a se-
curity interest in after-acquired property which was vulnerable
to attack by the bankrupt's trustee as a voidable preference un-
der section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. Those who defended the
validity of the lien argued that a properly perfected security
interest in after-acquired property was non-preferential and
therefore could not be set aside in favor of the debtor's unse-
cured creditors by a trustee exercising his powers under section
60. The fundamental issue on which resolution of this dispute
hinged can be understood most easily by an example.
At ti, five months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy peti-
tion, A and B enter into a security agreement 32 in which A agrees
29 Of course, what collateral is "of the same sort" will depend on the specificity with
which the collateral is described in the financing statement. Section 9-402(1) of the Uni-
form Commercial Code provides that a financing statement is sufficient if it contains "a
statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral." For certain goods,
additional detail may be necessary. See § 9-402(3). Section 9-110 states that for purposes
of Article 9, "any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient whether or
not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." As to whether a financing
statement purporting to cover after-acquired property must include a clause reporting
that coverage, see 1 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 11.6, at 357.
30 "The Article 9 draftsmen read their history to say that, in fact, the after-acquired
property interest, as well as inventory and receivables financing, was here to stay. What
was true in fact should be stated as law and all vestiges of the old theory should be
ruthlessly cut away." 1 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 11.6, at 355.
21 See notes 39-79 infra & accompanying text.
32 Section 9-105(l)(1) [§ 9-105(1)(h) (1962 version)] defines a "security agreement" as
an agreement which creates or provides for a security interest." By distinguishing se-
curity interest and security agreement, "the Code makes two terms grow where one grew
before." I GILMORE, supra note 6, § 11.4, at 346.
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
to lend B $75,000. The loan is to be repaid in three installments
at six month intervals. The loan is secured by a security interest
in B's entire inventory, valued at ti at $100,000. In addition, the
security agreement contains a provision that the loan is to be
further secured by any and all inventory that B may acquire in
the future, and that the value of the inventory securing the loan
shall not in any case fall below $100,000. If it does, A has the
option of treating as due and payable at once the entire amount
of the loan then outstanding. At ti, A gives B $75,000, receives in
return B's note for the full amount plus interest, and files a
complete financing statement 3 with the proper state office.
Five months later, B files a voluntary petition asking to be
adjudicated a bankrupt. 34 At the time of the petition he has on
hand inventory worth $100,000 and little else. None of the in-
ventory items held by B when he files his petition were in his
possession at ti. He has come into possession of, or, more pre-
cisely, he has "acquired rights"35 in, all of them during the
four-month period immediately preceding bankruptcy. During
this entire four-month period, B has been insolvent, and A has
known of B's insolvency. A files a secured claim 36 asserting a
valid security interest in the inventory. B's trustee challenges the
claim on the grounds that A's interest in the inventory constitutes
a voidable preference under section 60. Should A prevail against
B's trustee?
All but one of the elements of a preference 37 have clearly
been built into this example. The crucial question is whether the
last element, transfer for an "antecedent debt," is present. We
may assume that B's debt to A was incurred at ti, when A lent B
the $75,000.38 But when did the transfer occur in which B gave
A the security interest which A now claims in B's presently owned
inventory? If this transfer occured at ti, it was not for an antece-
3 In general, Article 9 provides that non-possessory security interests must be per-
fected by filing. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302(1). The secured party must file a
"financing statement." The formal requisites of the financing statement are detailed in §
9-402; the proper place for filing, in § 9-401.
' 4 See § 4(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 22(a) (1970).
" See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203(1)(c). For a discussion of the importance
of this subsection for the preference problem, see text accompanying notes 45-48 infra.
" See § 57(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93(a) (1970).
V See note 5 supra.
38 Under the "substitution of collateral" theory, it is argued that B incurs an addi-
tional debt to A each time an item of inventory is sold off and replaced. See note 58 infra
& accompanying text.
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dent but for a contemporaneous debt. But if the transfer did not
occur until B acquired rights in the individual items that A now
claims as collateral for his loan, then each such transfer was for
an antecedent debt and therefore voidable. The disputed validity
in bankruptcy of the Article 9 floating lien was thought to de-
pend upon this question of chronology: When did B's transfer to
A of a security interest in B's after-acquired property take place?
A. The Attack upon the Floating Lien
Those who contended that the transfer took place when the
debtor acquired rights in the collateral and was therefore for an
antecedent debt relied primarily on the following analysis. 39 Ac-
cording to section 9-303, "a security interest is perfected when it
has attached and when all of the applicable steps required for
perfection have been taken. ' 40 For a security interest to be per-
fected, section 9-303 requires that the secured party have com-
plied with whatever requirements were applicable, such as the
filing requirement, 41 the possession requirement, 42 or the special
rules governing the perfection of security interests in instru-
ments, documents, and goods covered by documents43 or gov-
erning the perfection of security interests in proceeds.44 In addi-
tion, the security interest claimed by the secured party must have
"attached." Prior to attachment the security interest is not, and
cannot be, fully perfected.
45
Section 9-203(1) provides that a security interest cannot at-
tach unless and until: "(a) the collateral is in the possession of the
39 See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 12, at 277 (1970); Gordon, The Security Interest in
Inventory Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Preference Problem, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 49 (1962); King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Does It
Insulate the Security Interest from Attack by a Trustee in Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1117
(1966); Riemer, Bankruptcy-Preference-Conflict Between Section 9-108 of the Uniform
Commercial Code and Section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 70 CoM. L.J. 63 (1965).
'0 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303(1).41 1d. § 9-302.
4 21d. § 9-305.
43 Id. § 9-304.
44Id. § 9-306.
45 The idea of "attachment" and the distinction between attachment and perfection
are novel aspects of Article 9. Professor Gilmore has suggested that the concept of
attachment was introduced to satisfy Karl Llewellyn's appetite for metaphysical clarity.
The draftsmen considered the concept "harmless, obvious and of merely theoretical
interest." I GILMORE, supra note 6, § 11.5, at 352. That this assessment was inaccurate is
amply borne out by the way the critics of the Article 9 floating lien have used the concept
of attachment to argue that the transfer of a security interest in after-acquired property
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secured party pursuant to agreement, or the debtor has signed a
security agreement which contains a description of the collateral
* . . and (b) value has been given; and (c) the debtor has rights in
the collateral. '46
In the hypothetical posed above, B (the debtor) acquired all
of his rights in the inventory held at the time of bankruptcy
during the preceding four-month period. Consequently, A's se-
curity interest in these individual inventory items must have
attached during the four-month preference period. As a result,
A's security interest in the inventory that he now claims as col-
lateral was perfected well after his initial loan to B and within the
preference period defined by section 60. Finally-and this is the
most important but weakest 47 link in the argument-the transfer
from B to A of a security interest in B's collateral cannot have
occurred before A's security interest achieved full perfection as
defined by section 9-303. Before then, A only had B's promise
that he would transfer to A a security interest in new inventory,
should he acquire any; B had not actually transferred such a
security interest, nor could he, until he himself acquired rights in
the collateral. It is obvious, it was argued, that B could not trans-
fer to A a legal entitlement to property in which he had no right
or interest at the time of the alleged "transfer. '48
Oddly enough, section 9-108, which was intended to protect
security interests in after-acquired property, makes this argu-
is a transfer for an antecedent debt. As a result, friends of the floating lien have sug-
gested that the idea of attachment be eliminated from Article 9 and that perfection be
tied directly to filing and the giving of value.
The idea of when a security interest 'attaches' does not seem to have much
utility, although it does make explicit that there must be an obligation and
agreement. Why not delete the reference to the debtor's rights in the collateral?
Why could not perfection (incorporating sections 9-303 and 9-204) depend on
the existence of a security agreement, an obligation (value) and filing (or what-
ever other steps for perfection are required)?
King, supra note 39, at 1132. See also 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1967).
46 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-203(1).
'7 See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
48 "[U]ntil the debtor acquired some interest in the future goods they belonged
entirely to someone else and, consequently, any interest the debtor purported to create in
them could not have been a transfer of his property. When such goods were finally
acquired, the creditor's loan, made sometime before, was in fact an antecedent obligation
of the debtor." Gordon, supra note 39, at 70 (footnote omitted).
Professor Countryman, argues that this view coincides with the pre-Code position,
that "no lien, legal or equitable, can be created until the goods [are] acquired by the
bankrupt," citing Union Trust Co. v. Townshend, 101 F.2d 903 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 646 (1939), and Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors Corp., 68 F.2d 864,
868-69 (2d Cir. 1934). Countryman, supra note 12, at 275.
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ment more plausible.49 The section explicitly states that a se-
curity interest in after-acquired collateral "shall be deemed to be
taken for new value and not as security for an antecedent
debt. '50 Such wording arguably demonstrates that the draftsmen
assumed that the time of transfer of a security interest would
otherwise be the time of attachment. Having conceded the point,
the draftsmen failed to provide an effective cure.51 The Bank-
ruptcy Act looks to state law, 52 here the Uniform Commercial
Code, to determine when a security interest is so far perfected
that it may be said to be transferred. But whether a transfer
fixed by state law at ti was for an antecedent debt is quite a
different question, and one which the Bankruptcy Act does not
leave open. Instead, the Act tacitly incorporates a common sense
test of antecedence: whether the debt was incurred prior to tI.
5 3
49 For a discussion of the impact of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108 on the
preference problem, see P. COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTS, 1 SECURED TRANSACTIONS
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1207-16 (1963); 2 GiUIoRE, supra note 6, § 45.6;
Ashe, [The Bankruptcy Act Vis-a-Vis the Uniform Commercial Code] Part 2-The Floating Lien
Under UCC 9-108 New Consideration or Antecedent Debt, 75 Com. L.J. 61 (1970); Country-
man, supra note 12, at 276; Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired
Property Clauses Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 194 (1959); Riemer, supra note 39.
50 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-108.
51 The conclusion of one writer was that § 9-108 "(1) is probably unnecessary; (2) is
quite likely self-defeating; (3) attempts, however, to bring about a commercially desirable
result; and (4) should be rewritten or amended to effectuate this result." Friedman, supra
note 49, at 197.
52 For an exhaustive discussion of the role played by state law in bankruptcy proceed-
ings, see Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (pts. 1, 2), 47 N.Y.U.L. REV.
407, 631 (1972). According to Professor Countryman:
Originally, and to a large extent still, section 60 embodies a purely federal
bankruptcy concept, although it will usually be state law that determines (1) the
events which constitute a transfer as defined in section 1(30), (2) the assets
owned and liabilities owed by the debtor which will establish whether he was
insolvent as defined in section 1(19) when the transfer occurred, (3) whether the
transferee was a creditor with an antecedent debt within the meaning of section
60, and (4) whether the transferee was already fully secured so that the effect of
the transfer was not to prefer him over other unsecured or partially secured
creditors within the meaning of section 60. But, while section 60 thus looks to
state law to determine the events on which it operates .... the meaning of the
operative terms of section 60, such as 'transfer' and 'antecedent debt' is a federal
question....
Id. 632.
53 If the statement in the Code comment [to § 9-108] that, "The determination
of when a transfer is for antecedent debt is largely left by the Bankruptcy Act to
state law" is supposed to mean that state law may define the meaning of "an-
tecedent." I know of no authority for the proposition and I doubt that the man
who wrote the sentence knows of any either. A more accurate statement would
be that the Bankruptcy Act in § 60 and elsewhere leaves to other law, usually
state law, the determination when a debt is created and when a transfer
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In attempting to "deem" this test out of existence, one critic has
argued,54 section 9-108 exceeds the authority left to state law by
the Bankruptcy Act and must give way to the superior federal
statute.55 As a result, section 9-108 fails to insulate security in-
terests in after-acquired property from attack as preferential
transfers.
B. The Defense of the Floating Lien
The defenders of the Article 9 floating lien offered a variety
of arguments in rebuttal. Their first two arguments, remarkably
abstract, were designed to show that the transfer by a debtor of a
security interest in his after-acquired property is not for an an-
tecedent debt at all, but rather for a debt incurred simultane-
ously with the transfer.
One argument, based upon the "entity" theory, 56 accom-
occurs-save as perfection provisions in § 60 and elsewhere provide that the
transfer is not deemed made for bankruptcy purposes until perfected against
specified third parties. Once those two times are established, the bankruptcy
court has never needed any help-and, I believe, is not authorized to take any
help-from state law to determine whether one time is antecedent to the other.
Countryman, supra note 12, at 276 (footnotes omitted).
'4 Countryman, supra note 52, at 635.
" "What constitutes a transfer and when it is complete within the meaning of § 60(a)
of the Bankruptcy Act is necessarily a federal question, since it arises under a federal
statute intended to have uniform application throughout the United States." McKenzie v.
Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1945).
56 The "entity" or "unitary" theory was first (and perhaps most clearly) formulated
by Chief Judge Magruder in Manchester Nat'l Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir.
1951), a case involving the assignment of after-acquired accounts under the New Hamp-
shire Factors' Lien Act, N.H. Laws 1943, c. 161, amended, N.H. Laws 1949, c. 156 (repeal
effective 1961). Judge Magruder's vivid formulation was admittedly pure dictum, con-
trary to the applicable statute. According to Judge Magruder,
[I]t might be possible to treat a merchant's accounts receivable as a unit pres-
ently and continuously in existence, the component elements of which (the par-
ticular accounts) may be constantly changing, without affecting the identity of
the res; so that a general assignment by way of security of accounts receivable
present and future might be deemed to create in praesenti a lien upon this
enduring unit, the accounts receivable, which lien would persist as a floating
charge upon such res, however much its component elements might change
from time to time by the payment of old accounts and the creation of new ones.
Id. at 831.
The most fervent proponent of the "entity" theory in recent years has been Ray
Henson. See Henson, supra note 12, at 232-37. It has been suggested, however, that the
"entity" theory is "hopelessly inconsistent" with the atomistic language of UmFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(2)(d) (1962 version) which provides that a security interest in
an account cannot attach "until [the account] comes into existence." 65 MIcH. L. REv.
1004, 1007 (1967). But see 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.5.
Another argument advanced against the "entity" theory, on policy grounds, is
that it is
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plished this result with a bit of metaphysical 57 sleight of hand, by
moving back the transfer of the security interest in the debtor's
after-acquired property to the time of the initial loan (tl). The
"entity" advocates insisted that the collateral underlying a loan
secured by inventory or receivables consists not of the individual
goods or claims possessed by the debtor at ti, but rather the
continuous stream of assets whose general contours (that is,
whose overall financial value) remain constant despite the con-
tinual replacement of its component parts. There is, it was ar-
gued, no after-acquired property problem at all, because the
collateral securing the loan remains unchanged. There is only
one transfer of a security interest in the continuing "res" of the
debtor's inventory or receivables, rather than a series of tempo-
rally discrete transfers, each occurring as the debtor acquires
rights in a new item of inventory or a new account. This single
transfer occurs at ti and is for a contemporaneous, not an ante-
cedent, debt.
The second argument in support of the validity of the Arti-
cle 9 floating lien conceptually shifted forward the time at which
the debt is incurred. Accepting the proposition that the transfer
of a security interest in after-acquired property occurs when the
debtor acquires rights in individual items composing the collat-
eral, this theory held that new value is transferred from the
secured party to the debtor at the same time. According to
proponents of this view, 58 the secured party's assent to his
too blunt a tool for properly balancing the interests of secured and unsecured
creditors, since it may approve the kind of conduct that the preference law
historically condemns, i.e., the conscious and deliberate transfer of property to a
favored creditor within four months of bankruptcy [for example, through the
use of crash sales of inventory to feed a lien on receivables].
Hogan, Games Lawyers Play with the Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to Accounts and Inventory
Financing, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 553, 561 (1968).
The "entity" theory is most compelling when the collateral involved is composed of
many individual items that replace each other with great rapidity. When the collateral is
composed of a few items which are "turned over" at lengthy intervals, the theory is
inappropriate. See 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 678, 697 (1968).
'7 See Henson, supra note 12 at 233: "The paradox of Heraclitus is applicable to the
flow of inventory into proceeds and back again: you cannot step twice into the same river
.... The paradox suggests the process of change in all life." See G. KIRK & J. RAVEN,
THE PRESOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS 196-97 (1962); PLATO, CRATYLUS 673 (B. Jowett ed.
1871).
'8 This so-called "substitution of collateral" doctrine has been expounded and de-
fended in numerous law review articles. See, e.g., Hogan, supra note 56, at 561-63;
Krause, Kripke, & Seligson, The Code and the Bankruptcy Act: Three Views on Preferences and
After-Acquired Property, 42 N.Y.U.L. REV. 278, 282 (1967); Note, After-Acquired Property
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debtor's liquidation of the collateral (by selling the inventory or
collecting the accounts), and to the debtor's use of the proceeds
as he sees fit, itself constitutes fresh consideration supporting
subjection of new collateral to the lender's security interest. Once
again the transfer of a security interest is for a contemporaneous
debt. As with the "entity" theory, the antecedence problem is
conceptualized away.
The third and perhaps most popular argument supporting
the Article 9 floating lien turns upon analysis of the different
perfection requirements of section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy
Act 59 and section 303 of Article 9.60 Under the Bankruptcy Act,
a transfer takes place when a security interest is so far perfected
that no subsequent lien, obtainable in a judicial proceeding on a
simple contract, can become superior to that interest. The Act
Security Interests in Bankruptcy: A Substitution of Collateral Defense of the U.C.C., 77 YALE L.J.
139 (1967). The Note anticipates § 4-607(d) of the proposed Bankruptcy Act in pointing
out that "[i]t has long been held that a mere substitution or exchange of property is not
preferential except to the extent that the value of the creditor's interest in the substituted
property exceeds the value of the creditor's interest in the original property," id. 146, and
in advocating a two-point test for measuring preferential transfers, id. 151-58. The "sub-
stitution of collateral" doctrine has also had its critics. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note
12, at 277.
The doctrine's origin appears to be in the line of "net result" cases, which held
that no Section 60 preference results from payments by a debtor to a supplier
of goods, even where such payments are not contemporaneous with delivery,
if they are part of a bona fide system of open account on running credit, and
there is no net diminution of the debtor's estate within the four-month period
taken as a whole.
Note, supra, at 155 n.69. See, e.g., Jaquith v. Alden, 189 U.S. 78 (1903); In re Fred Stern &
Co. 54 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1931); In re Stewart, 233 F. Supp. 89 (D. Ore. 1964). Perhaps
the most frequently quoted of these cases is In re Pusey, Maynes, Breish Co., i22 F.2d
606, 608 (3d Cir. 1941), which held that an assignment of new accounts during the
four-month period immediately preceding bankruptcy does not constitute a voidable
preference, despite the fact that "the withdrawal and substitution of security" are not
simultaneous. (The court added that "in a proper case the excess, i.e., the difference in
value between the new security and the old, [might constitute] a preference to that
extent.") For a compilation of the relevant cases, see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 60.20,
60.21 (14th ed. 1975).
59 Section 60a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970), provides in part,
that
for the purposes of subdivisions a and b of [§ 60], a transfer of property other
than real property shall be deemed to have been made or suffered at the time
when it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon such property
obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become
superior to the rights of the transferee.
60 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-303.
See Friedman, supra note 49, at 218-19. This argument has been followed by many of
the courts that have held Article 9 security interests in after-acquired property immune
from attack under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. See note 73 infra.
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does not demand the state of absolute perfection, including at-
tachment, 6' defined by section 9-303. The process of perfection
may reach the stage necessary for a transfer under the Act prior
to perfection under Article 9.
In our hypothetical, a lien creditor would have nothing to
attach after the financing statement was filed but before B ac-
quired rights in the collateral. As soon as B acquires those rights,
A's security interest attaches, before any lien creditor has had an
opportunity to make a prior attachment. Even if the lien and
security interest attached simultaneously, the lien would not be
superior to the security interest, only equal or inferior to it. This
situation does not contravene the requirements of section 60a(2).
Thus, the security interest in after-acquired property reaches the
proper level of perfection at the time of filing, not the time of
attachment.
When the Bankruptcy Act states a substantive definition or
rule of law, such as the section 60a(2) perfection test, inconsis-
tent or conflicting state rules must give way. By applying the
section 60a(2) perfection test to our hypothetical situation, we
arrive at the conclusion that, for bankruptcy purposes, the se-
curity interest in the debtor's after-acquired property was suffi-
ciently perfected at ti to be deemed transferred at ti, that is, for
a contemporaneous debt.
Proponents of the Article 9 floating lien insisted that the
three technical arguments just reviewed derive additional
strength from two policy considerations based upon legislative
intent. First, we are told,62 the draftsmen of Article 9 wanted to
facilitate inventory and accounts receivable financing by giving
express statutory support to the floating lien arrangement. In
doing so, they did not intend to make possible an arrangement
that had been impossible before. They were merely streamlining,
and thereby reducing the transaction costs of, a type of financing
that previously had required complicated and expensive
techniques. 63 Commercial good sense would dictate upholding
the validity in bankruptcy of the Article 9 floating lien unless
61 See text accompanying note 40 supra.
62 1 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 11.6, at 355, 359.
63 "[C]urrent asset financing has always been possible-the Code merely facilitates
the process, and it does so without harming anyone." 65 MICH. L. REV. 1004, 1012-13
(1967). A sophisticated financer was required to go to great lengths under the pre-Code
law to insure that his security interest in revolving collateral would be subject neither to
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strong policy considerations, in addition to technical reasons, dic-
tated otherwise.
Secondly, it was argued, the legislative history of section 60
reveals that the draftsmen never intended to strike down inven-
tory and accounts receivable financing. 64 The real thrust of sec-
tion 60 in both its 1938 and 1950 versions was to destroy the
"equitable pledge. '65 Unfortunately, the 1938 bona fide pur-
the dominion rule of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), nor to invalidation because
of the after-acquired character of the collateral. See, e.g., In re New Haven Clock & Watch
Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958).
64 Nothing in the legislative history of either the 1938 or 1950 amendments to § 60
indicates that the evil sought to be eliminated was the security interest in after-acquired
property. Indeed, Professor MacLachlan, who authored the 1938 amendment, stated
that "we are not saying you cannot make a mortgage on after-acquired property. What
we do say is that a lien is not regarded as made for the purpose of the law of preference
... until it is so far perfected as to be good as against a bona-fide purchaser." Hearings on
H.R. 6439 & H.R. 8046 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 1st Sess., ser.
9, at 123 (1937) [hereinafter cited as Revision Hearings].
The "bona fide purchaser" test incorporated in the 1938 version of § 60, Act of June
22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 869, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970), was scaled down in
1950 to the 'judicial lien creditor" test that appears in present § 60a(2). Act of March 18,
1950, ch. 70, § 1, 64 Stat. 24. In its report explaining the 1950 changes, the House
Committee on the Judiciary emphasized that the Chandler Amendment of 1938 tended
"to impede and choke the flow of credit, principally to small-businessmen." H.R. REP.
No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949). To relieve the crimp in the flow of commercial
credit, caused by the 1938 amendment of § 60 and aggravated by the interpretation of
that section in Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), the
1950 revision of § 60 sought to make clear that "no transfer made in good faith, for a
new present consideration [which the Committee left undefined], shall constitute a pref-
erence . . . if the provisions of applicable State law governing the perfection of such
transfer are complied with." H.R. REP. No. 1293, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
The view of the author of the 1938 amendment was "that § 60 was not intended to
apply to transactions like those authorized by article 9." 65 MICH. L. Rav. 1004, 1011
n.38 (1967).
65 The voidable preference section in the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 51, § 60, 30
Star. 562, did not contain a test for determining at what time a transfer was made for
bankruptcy purposes. This omission became a matter of congressional concern following
a series of Supreme Court cases upholding the validity in bankruptcy of the "secret lien"
or "equitable pledge." See Carey v. Donohue, 240 U.S. 430 (1916); Sexton v. Kessler, 225
U.S. 90 (1912); Humphrey v. Tatman, 198 U.S. 91 (1905); Thompson v. Fairbanks, 196
U.S. 516 (1905). Under these decisions, a creditor with a non-possessory security interest
in his debtor's property, who had not filed or otherwise notified third parties, could
successfully perfect his security interest even on the eve of his debtor's bankruptcy (usu-
ally by taking physical possession of the collateral itself). Such a creditor would prevail
over third-party claimants who had not even known, prior to the debtor's collapse into
insolvency, of the existence of the creditor's interest in the collateral. Congress felt that
the result in these cases was wrong. Its remedy was revision of the voidable preference
section of the Bankruptcy Act to make clear that for bankruptcy purposes, the transfer in
the typical "equitable pledge" situation occurs when the security interest is perfected, and
does not "relate back" to the time of the original-and, by definition, private-agreement
between the secured creditor and his debtor. Early amendments which sought to achieve
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chaser test killed not only the equitable pledge but nearly all
legitimate forms of accounts receivable and inventory financing
as well.66 The reversion in 1950 to a judicial lien creditor test
reflected the bankruptcy bar's honest if belated realization that
the real culprit was the unrecorded mortgage (on inventory, re-
ceivables, equipment, or other) and not the floating lien per se.
67
this result failed of their purpose. See Act of Feb. 5, 1903, ch. 487, 32 Stat. 799, amended,
Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 412, 36 Stat. 842, amended, Act of May 27, 1926, ch. 406, 44
Stat. 666, as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970). These amendments, and the case law
interpreting them, are discussed in 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 4, 1 60.37.
The 1938 amendment of § 60 once again sought to eliminate "equitable" liens of the
Sexton v. Kessler variety. See Revision Hearings, supra note 64, ser. 9, at 123. As the tes-
timony of the chief draftsman of the 1938 amendment makes clear, the revised version
of § 60, with its "bona fide purchaser" test, was intended to reach the Kessler or Thompson
situation, but not to invalidate properly perfected security interests in after-acquired
property. Id. In the latter case, the filing required for proper perfection would put third
parties on notice of the secured creditor's claim and presumably would obviate the need
for further legislative action.
Unfortunately, the scope of the 1938 amendment reached considerably beyond the
intentions of its draftsmen. See note 66 infra. To facilitate the flow of credit to small
businessmen, whose capital structure often made inventory and non-notification accounts
receivable financing especially attractive, § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act was amended once
again in 1950. The 1950 amendment substituted a 'judicial lien creditor" test for the
"bona fide purchaser" test in the 1938 version of § 60a(2) and added a new subsection (6)
which declared the recognition of equitable liens "to be contrary to the policy of this
section." The purpose of these changes was to reverse the trend following Corn Exch.
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), while retaining the Chandler
Amendment's prohibition of secret liens of the Thompson and Kessler sort. H.R. REP. No.
1293, 81 st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1949). See also MacLachlan, Preference Redefined, 63 HARV.
L. REV. 1390 (1950).
66 In the entire history of statutory drafting, the 1938 revision of § 60 is the
classical example of overkill. It presently appeared that the draftsmen, taking
dead aim at Sexton v. Kessler, had also brought down non-notification accounts
receivable financing arrangements in a great many states and, in all probability,
all inventory financing arrangements in all states. The reason why the revision
was effective to strike down Sexton v. Kessler and like cases was that the common
law rule about imperfect pledges, on which the bankruptcy rule was vaguely
based, had been that good faith purchasers from the pledgor before delivery
took free of the "equitable pledgee's" interest. The unpremeditated destruction
resulted from the facts that in all inventory financing buyers take free of the se-
curity interest and that, in so-called English rule states, the assignee of a chose in
action who did not notify the obligor of his assignment could lose to a later
assignee. Thus such arrangements could never be perfected against potential
"bona fide purchasers" and consequently could always be avoided as preferences
(since, at the date of filing the bankruptcy petition, the debtor would be, by
necessary hypothesis, insolvent and known to be so).
2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.3.3, at 1302.
67 See notes 64 & 65 supra.
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act was never intended to invalidate the floating
lien recognized by section 9-108 of the UCC. The purpose of the Chandler Act
amendment was to invalidate the unrecorded equitable interest in Sexton v.
Kessler, of which subsequent creditors had no notice. The legislative history of
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Since Article 9 expressly validates the floating lien, and since it
has never been the aim of section 60 to invalidate the lien, one
distorts the basic objectives of both statutes by construing the
Article 9 security interest in after-acquired property as a void-
able preference.
C. The Developing Case Law
All of these arguments, for and against the validity of the
Article 9 floating lien in bankruptcy, had been debated exhaus-
tively by the time the first case involving the issue was decided.68
A series of cases 6: litigating this precise issue followed in rapid
the act reveals no concern with the automatic lien on after-acquired inventory or
receivables, a basic security device in the financing industry.
44 TEXAs L. REV. 1369, 1377 (1966).
68 Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967), noted in 20 ALA. L. REV.
135 (1967), 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 790 (1968), and 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 678 (1968). Rosenberg
involved the validity in bankruptcy of a properly filed Article 9 security interest in
after-acquired inventory. The bankrupt's trustee argued that under § 9-303, a security
interest in after-acquired property is perfected only when the interest "attaches," and
that attachment cannot occur before the debtor acquires rights in the collateral. In
rejecting this argument, the court held that "[p]erfection under state law need not be full
perfection but only perfection so far as is necessary to meet the test of § 60(a)(2)." 262 F.
Supp. at 638. Sufficient perfection was attained when Rudnick filed his financing state-
ment. Id.
The court stressed that the § 9-108 definition of antecedent debt should be accepted
because it is in accord with current business practice, and that the provisions of Article 9
concerning perfection and attachment should not be read to demand a contrary result.
The court also emphasized that the lien involved, although on after-acquired property,
was not "secret," and that Rudnick had not made an illicit effort to "outrace" other
creditors. For these reasons, the court concluded that its holding would not frustrate the
policy objectives of § 60.
69 In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967), aff'd
sub nom. DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969); In re White, 283 F. Supp. 208
(S.D. Ohio 1967); Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
1969); Biggins v. Southwest Bank, 322 F. Supp. 62 (S.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 490 F.2d 1304
(9th Cir. 1973); In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 93 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd
per curiam, 452 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1971); In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir.
1971); Owen v. McKesson & Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327 (N.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd
mem., 486 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973); E.F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974);
In re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1974).
Of these cases, the most widely discussed were the Portland Newspaper case, noted in
22 ARK. L. REv. 501 (1968), 1 GA. L. REv. 257 (1967), 28 MD. L. REv. 78 (1968), 65 MicH.
L. REV. 1004 (1967), 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1967), 44 TEXAs L. REV. 1369 (1966), 16 U.
KAN. L. REV. 394 (1968), and 1968 Wis. L. REv. 246; and the Grain Merchants case, noted
in 64 Nw. L. REv. 705 (1969) and 23 Sw. L.J. 745 (1969).
In Portland Newspaper many members of the local printers' unions had lost their jobs
as a result of an unsuccessful strike against Portland's two largest newspapers. To provide
their members with employment, the unions themselves organized and published a rival
newspaper, the Portland Reporter. The unions also formed the Rose City Development
Company, which leased equipment and made loans to the Reporter. These loans were
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succession. In all but one,7 0 the courts concluded that a prop-
erly recorded Article 9 security interest in after-acquired prop-
erty could not be set aside as a voidable preference under section
60. More often than not, this conclusion was supported not by
one argument, but by a host of arguments drawn from the basic
secured by a lien on the Reporter's then existing and after-acquired accounts receivable.
Rose City made a proper Article 9 filing when the loans were made. Two years later the
Reporter was adjudicated bankrupt, and Rose City filed a claim asserting its security
interest in the bankrupt's accounts receivable.
The Reporter's trustee in bankruptcy argued that the transfer of an Article 9 security
interest cannot take place before the interest's attachment (which was specified as the
time the account "comes into existence," UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(2)(d) (1962
version)). As a result, the trustee argued, Rose City's security interest in any account
arising after the filing of its financing statement was transferred for an antecedent debt.
The referee in bankruptcy accepted this argument, but both the district court and the
court of appeals rejected it. Writing for the Ninth Circuit, Judge Hufstedler declared:
Congress did not state that a "transfer" occurs when a security interest
attaches or when state law says a conveyance has been made. Congress provided
that a transfer is "deemed" to have been made when it became "so far per-
fected" that no subsequent lien creditor could achieve priority. "Transfer" for
the purpose of section 60a(2) is thus equated with the act by which priority over
later creditors is achieved and not with the event which attaches the security
interest to a specific amount.
We look to state law, therefore, only to decide the point at which Rose City's
claim to the future accounts was sufficiently asserted to prevent a subsequent
lien creditor from achieving priority over it in those accounts. That time was the
date upon which Rose City filed its financing statement .... Because Rose City
filed its financing statement long before the four-month period anteceding bank-
ruptcy, its security interest is immune from the trustee's preference challenge.
DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1287-88 (9th Cir. 1969).
The Grain Merchants case also involved the status of a properly filed Article 9 security
interest in after-acquired accounts, but arose in a more traditional commercial setting
than did the Portland Newspaper case. The bankrupt's trustee repeated the argument of
the Reporter trustee. In rejecting his theory, the court in Grain Merchants held that per-
fection, for § 60a(2) purposes, occurs when a security interest in after-acquired prop-
erty is filed. The court also made use of the "entity" theory, see note 56 supra, and the
"substitution of collateral" doctrine, see note 58 supra.
70 E.F. Corp. v. Smith, 496 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1974). In that case, Elmer Fox & Co.,
a certified accounting firm, had rendered services periodically for the bankrupt. In
November, 1971, to secure $20,000 already owed to Fox and to provide security for
contemplated future services, the bankrupt gave Fox a note for $40,149.44 and a chattel
mortgage on certain oil properties that it owned. By the time of bankruptcy, in May,
1972, the November, 1971 debt had been reduced to $8,000. During the four-month
period immediately preceding bankruptcy, however, Fox had performed additional ser-
vices for the bankrupt for which it had not received full compensation. Fox claimed that
its chattel mortgage secured both the $8,000 debt and the monies owing for its services to
the bankrupt during the four-month preference period. The referee's decision to allow
the first claim but to disallow the second one was upheld by the district court and the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
The court of appeals began by noting that § 9-303(1) provides that a security interest
cannot be perfected before it has attached, and that § 9-204(1) stipulates that a security
interest cannot attach until "value is given." Id. at 830. It then concluded that because
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catalogue outlined above. The "entity" theory, 71 the "substitution
of collateral" doctrine, 72 the primacy of the section 60a(2) per-
fection test,73 and commercial good sense 74 were all invoked, in
some cases by the same court,75 to explain why an Article 9
floating lien is valid in bankruptcy. Such a plethora of justifica-
Fox "was not bo-und in November, 1971, to perform future accounting services," he did
not give value until "the services were performed .... Accordingly, there was no relation
back to the November transaction and the claim of secured status falls." Id. at 831.
The court was careful to distinguish Portland Newspaper and Grain Merchants:
In those cases money had been lent and the question was whether the security
interest attached to items which came into existence within the four-month
period. Our situation is different. We are not concerned with the nature and
extent of the security interest but rather with the right of the creditor to a pre-
ferred status on the basis of personal services rendered within the four-month
period ....
We see no conflict between this result [i.e., the result in E.F. Corp.] and the
holdings in the accounts receivable and after-acquired inventory cases. In those
cases the benefit had been received by the bankrupt before the four-month
cutoff. In the instant case it had not. To permit relation back of a claim for
voluntary personal services within the four-month period would provide a loop
hole which, in our opinion, was not intended by either the Bankruptcy Act or
the Uniform Commercial Code.
Id.
The court's reasoning in E.F. Corp. is unsound. To the extent that it was held invalid,
the bankrupt's transfer to Fox of a security interest in its oil properties was not a transfer
for an antecedent debt at all. It was a "future advance," made in return for a considera-
tion received by the transferor subsequently, see 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY supra note 58,
60.19, therefore falling entirely outside the ambit of § 60. Besides, Article 9 explicitly
provides that "[o]bligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances
or other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment
. ... " UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(3) [§ 9-204(5) (1962 version)]. Confirmatory
agreements, at the time value is given, are unnecessary. Id., Comment 5.
Because it carefully distinguishes Portland Newspaper and Grain Merchants, and be-
cause its own analysis is so murky, E.F. Corp. should not be read as in any way qualifying
the otherwise universal judicial acceptance of the validity in bankruptcy of the Article 9
security interest in after-acquired property.
71 Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 215-17 (7th Cir. 1969);
In re Nickerson & Nickerson, Inc., 329.F. Supp. 93, 96 (D. Neb. 1971).
72 Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Sav. Co., 408 F.2d 209, 217-18 (7th Cir. 1969).
31n re Wilco Forest Mach., Inc., 491 F.2d 1041, 1046-47 (5th Cir. 1974); In re
King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 730 (5th Cir. 1971); DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277,
1287-88 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants v. Union Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209,
212-15 (7th Cir. 1969); Owen v. McKesson & Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327,
1331-32 (N.D. Fla. 1972); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 638 (D. Mass. 1967).
7 4 In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722, 732 (5th Cir. 1971); In re Portland Newspaper
Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395, 400 (D. Ore.), aff'd sub nom. DuBay v. Williams, 417
F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1967); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D. Mass. 1967).
75In re King-Porter Co., 446 F.2d 722 (5th Cir. 1971); Grain Merchants v. Union
Bank & Say. Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1969); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635
(D. Mass. 1967). See generally Healy, The Floating Lien Controversy in the Courts: Judicial
Response to the Preference Problem, 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 265 (1969).
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tions may evidence judicial misgivings about the persuasiveness
of any single argument. Despite this equivocation about why an
Article 9 floating lien should be insulated from attack under
section 60, a clear judicial consensus emerged that it should be so
insulated.
When the draftsmen of section 4-607 of the proposed revi-
sion of the Bankruptcy Act began their work in 1966, the exten-
sive law review literature had already raised considerable doubt
about the validity in bankruptcy of any Article 9 security interest
in after-acquired inventory or receivables. At first, the drafts-
men apparently felt that section 60 should be redrafted to make
clear that such a security interest is not a voidable preference.
76
As the debate moved into the courts, it became clear that the
draftsmen's initial fears were groundless.
In fact, the pendulum had begun to swing the other way:
The Article 9 floating lien on inventory and receivables was so
well-received by the courts that the real danger soon appeared to
be that secured parties might take "blanket liens on all the pres-
ent and future personal property of their debtors, make no
further advances and sleep peacefully in the assurance that, on
bankruptcy day, all the assets will come to them.
77
Although the original concern of the draftsmen of section
4-607 had been protection of the secured party who provided
financing on the basis of after-acquired inventory and receiva-
bles, their project gradually metamorphosed into a "rescue mis-
sion for unsecured creditors. ' 78 As a result, the Committee was
obliged to reevaluate the competing interests of secured and
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy proceedings, and to attempt
"a fair and sensible resolution of the underlying policy issues. ' 79
II. SECURITY INTERESTS IN AFTER-ACQUIRED
PROPERTY UNDER SUBSECTION 4-607(d)
The voidable preference section of the proposed Bank-
ruptcy Act is section 4-607.80 The section's basic structure is rela-
76 Note 8 supra.
77 1970 CoMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
78 Id.
79 1d. 7.
'0 For the text of this section of the bill, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607 (1975),
see note 7 supra. All references in the text are to this legislation. For an account of the
proposals now before Congress, see note 1 supra.
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tively simple. Subsection (a), the operative subsection, gives the
bankrupt's trustee the right to recover property that was (1)
transferred by the bankrupt to pay or secure an antecedent debt,
during the three month period preceding the filing of the peti-
tion and while the bankrupt was insolvent, or (2) transferred to
any one of a group of specified "insiders," to pay or secure an
antecedent debt, while the bankrupt was insolvent and the trans-
feree had "reasonable cause to believe" he was insolvent, during
the period "commencing one year before and ending three
months before the date of the petition."8'
Subsections (b), (c), and (d) state exceptions to the general
rule of subsection (a).82 Subsection (e)83 deals with the avoidance
by the trustee of certain indemnifying transfers by the bankrupt
to his surety; subsection (f)84 states a presumption regarding the
bankrupt's insolvency during the three-month period preceding
the filing of the petition; and the last subsection, (g),85 defines
several of the most important terms used in section 4-607.
Section 4-607's treatment of security interests in after-
acquired property generates problems in at least four areas.
First, the language of subsection (g)(1) leaves a major gap in the
structure of the Act, opening the possibility that security in-
8 1 d.
H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607(a) (1975), differs in several respects. The old
preference period of four months is retained for most cases. For insider transfers, a
preference during the year prior to the petition requires proof only of simple insolvency
and not also that the insider have had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent.
Under H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), the trustee benefits from a presumption
of the debtor's insolvency, § 4-607(f), during the three months prior to the petition; but
in the nine-month period preceding that, for insider transfers, the trustee has the "bur-
den of proving" both insolvency and reasonable cause to believe, § 4-607(a)(2). Under
H.R. 32, the trustee has both the presumption of insolvency, § 4-607(g), and the burden
of proving insolvency in the four-month preference period, § 4-607(a)(2). During the
eight months prior to that, the insider transferee has the burden of proof. The combina-
tion of §§ 4-607(a)(2) and (g) in H.R. 32 would be a sure breeder of litigation.
82 H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), omits § 4-607(b)(1) of H.R. 31, 94th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1975), which provides that certain transfers of small aggregate amounts to a
creditor are not voidable. H.R. 32 also adds an exception to an exception in its § 4-607(e).
83 Section 4-607(f) in H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
84 Sections 4-607(g) in H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). The presumption ex-
tends for four rather than three months. But see id. § 4-607(a)(2).
8 Sections 4-607(g)(1)-(5) of H,R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) are §§
4-607(h)(l)-(5) of H.R. 32. Section 4-607(h)(1) of H.R. 32 lengthens the "grace
period'---in which a debt, though chronologically earlier, is not antecedent-from five to
thirty days. It also omits certain exclusions provided in H.R. 31. Sections 4-607(g)(6 )-(7 )
of H.R. 31 are §§ 4-607(i)(l)-(2) of H.R. 32.
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terests in after-acquired property will receive too much protec-
tion from avoidance by a trustee. Second, section 4-607(d), which
carves out exceptions to the avoidance power of the trustee,
presents too rigid a test for inventory-and-receivables improve-
ments that are voidable; it may curtail important, and fair, forms
of financing. Third, section 4-607 does not consider the status of
subsequent appreciation in the value of property subject to a
security interest. Finally, the section unjustifiably accords less
favorable treatment to collateral composed of long-term or fixed
assets than to short-term collateral such as inventory or receiva-
bles. This Article aims to remedy these defects by proposing
amendments and additions to the section.
A. Time of Transfer
1. The Transfer and the Petition
Under the voidable preference sections of both the present
and proposed Acts, the time of a transfer that the trustee wishes
to avoid must be fixed in relation to the bankruptcy petition to
determine both the applicability of the preference period and
the point at which insolvency must be established. The time of
the transfer must also be fixed in relation to the debt that it pays
or secures in order to resolve the issue of antecedence.
Under present law, section 60a(2)8 6 fixes the time at which a
transfer is made or suffered, apparently87 for all purposes, 88 in
terms of the process of perfection. The draftsmen of the pro-
posed Act, however, have at least partially abandoned reliance
on the process of perfection as the test for determining the time
of transfer. Section 4-607(a) states that the time for measuring
the proximity of the transfer to the petition, and for testing the
debtor's solvency, is the time at which the transfer "occurred."
"Occurred" is used here as a term of art. The definitional sec-
tion of 4-607 states that a transfer "occurs" when it both "takes
effect" and is "perfected."8 9 Furthermore, a transfer does not
86 For the text of § 60a(2), see note 59 supra.
87 See DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
88 See notes 68-75 supra & accompanying text.
89 H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607(g)(7 ) (1975). Section 4 -60 7 (g)(7 ) includes
certain "relation back" provisions. If perfection takes place within ten days after the
transfer takes effect, then the transfer is deemed to occur when it takes effect. If per-
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"take effect" until the transferor acquires rights in the property.
Thus, the transfer of a security interest in after-acquired prop-
erty cannot "occur" before the debtor has acquired rights in the
property itself. In effect, the draftsmen of the proposed Act
have incorporated section 9-203(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, requiring the debtor's acquisition of rights for "attach-
ment" of a security interest, as part of the test for determining
the temporal proximity of the transfer to the bankruptcy peti-
tion.
According to 4 -6 07 (g)(7 ), for a transfer to "occur" it must
both "take effect" and be "perfected." Under the proposed Act,
the perfection of a transfer is to be determined by a formula
slightly though significantly different from that imbedded in sec-
tion 60a(2). The present law states that a transfer is deemed to
be made or suffered when no subsequent lien "obtainable by
legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract" can be
superior to the transferred interest.90 Under the 60a(2) test, the
"obtainable" lien must be "superior" to the interest transferred
in order to prevent the interest's perfection. 91 The proposed
Act, however, states that the transferred interest is perfected
only when it is superior. 92 Thus, where a lien could attach at the
same time the transfer "takes effect," if the transferee has taken
all other steps necessary for perfection, the present Bankruptcy
Act deems the transfer perfected, and the proposed Act deems it
unperfected.
This difference has important consequences for the treat-
ment of security interests in after-acquired property. Under state
law, a lien obtained after the filing of a financing statement and
the creation of a consensual security agreement can attach to
after-acquired property simultaneously with the attachment of
the consensual security interest itself.93 It could therefore be
argued that under the proposed Act, a security interest in after-
acquired property cannot be perfected in the bankruptcy sense
until the security interest has "attached," because at any point
fected later, the transfer occurs simultaneously with perfection. If the transfer has taken
effect but has not been perfected when a petition is filed, the transfer generally "dates"
from a time immediately prior to the filing of the petition.
90 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1970).
91 See notes 59-61 supra & accompanying text.
U2 H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4 -607(g)(6 ) (1975).
93 See 1970 COMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 19-20.
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prior to that a judicial lien creditor theoretically could acquire an
equal interest in the after-acquired property.
Thus, the language of section 4-607 states that a security
interest in after-acquired property cannot "take effect" until it
has attached, and strongly implies that such a security interest
cannot be perfected prior to attachment. Since a transfer "oc-
curs" only when it "takes effect" and is perfected, two indepen-
dent reasons appear to support the proposition that under the
proposed Act, the transfer of a properly filed security interest in
after-acquired property cannot occur prior to its attachment.
9 4
2. The Transfer and the Debt
"Antecedent debt" is a defined term of art in the proposed
Act. It is generally "a debt incurred more than five days before a
transfer paying or securing the debt.19 5 Unfortunately this def-
inition begs the crucial question: When does a transfer pay or
secure the debt? Does the definition refer to the time of "occur-
rence," of "effectiveness," or of "perfection"? Or does the Act
adopt the time of transfer as defined by state law? If the pro-
94 Of course, one might try to revive the "entity" argument to sustain a floating lien.
See notes 56 & 57 supra & accompanying text. The debtor, it would be argued, acquired
rights in an entity called "inventory" at the time of or prior to the filing of a security
agreement; thus, the transfer took effect at the time of filing. The argument has signific-
ant flaws. While the debtor's acquisition of rights is necessary to effectiveness, it may not
be sufficient. Secondly, related supporting arguments for floating liens are not available
here. The substitution of collateral theory, for example, is not applicable because moving
forward the time of incurring the debt still places the transfer within the preference
period and makes it voidable. Thirdly, the structure of the proposed Act and its practical
approach preclude such abstract theorizing. The Act itself provides for exceptions when
it deems them warranted; and because the Act was drafted with the Uniform Commer-
cial Code in mind, the problem of construing statutes drafted in "diverse universes," see
note 10 supra, no longer exists.
One would also have to attempt to hurdle the second line of defense, the new test of
perfection. Because perfection turns on whether more than one lien or interest can
attach at a single moment, a court might be convinced that it was presented with a typical
second-before, second-after problem, see generally, e.g., Haskins, Dower in Mortgaged
Property, 5 MIANuI L. REV. 187, 191-93 (1951), and find the possibility of equal claims
remote enough to make the security interest superior to all conceivable liens and thus
perfected. Indeed, slight changes in the proposed Act would foreclose such metaphysical
legerdemain and assure that only those security interests in after-acquired property spe-
cifically excepted would survive. While the likelihood of success for such conceptualiza-
tion may be deemed slight and changes therefore unnecessary, these slight changes are
set forth at note 99 infra.
15 H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607(g)(1) (1975). This provision also contains
several types of debt which are deemed never to be antecedent. H.R. 32, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) contains a more limited exclusion, and provides for thirty days rather than
five.
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posal is left unaltered, only extensive litigation will resolve the
question.
Under the language of the proposal as now written, the
most natural solution would be to say that the draftsmen meant
the time of transfer employed for determining antecedence to be
the same as that used for measuring the proximity of the trans-
fer to the bankruptcy petition; namely, the time of "occurrence."
On this reading, since a transfer cannot "occur" until it "takes
effect," and cannot take effect until the transferor has rights in
the property, a security interest in after-acquired property must
be, by definition, a transfer for antecedent debt.
96
To read antecedence as depending on the time the transfer
"takes effect" between the parties, rather than on the time it
"occurs," leads to undesirable results. A transfer may "take ef-
fect" between two parties before being perfected and therefore
binding upon third parties.97 Thus suppose X lends Y a sum of
money in exchange for which X takes a security interest in Y's
yacht. X and Y enter into a security agreement at the time Y
incurs the debt, but X fails to file a financing statement. The
transfer has "taken effect" between the parties, although X has
not perfected his security interest. On the eve of Y's bankruptcy
a year later, X finally perfects his security interest by filing a
proper financing statement. If a transfer pays or secures when it
"takes effect" between the parties, X's security interest in Y's
yacht will have been transferred to X at the time he made his
loan to Y and entered a security agreement with him. It will have
been transferred for a contemporaneous rather than an antece-
dent debt. This result is undesirable because it would allow sec-
ured parties to maintain secret liens and circumvent the opera-
tion of the voidable preference section of the proposed Act.
Equally strong reasons support rejecting the suggestion that
"a transfer paying or securing" means "the perfection of a trans-
96 A creditor here might invoke not only the "entity" theory, see notes 56 & 57 supra
& accompanying text, but also the "substitution of collateral" argument, see note 58 supra
& accompanying text, to circumvent a finding of antecedence. But here again the lack of
policy support and the diminished necessity of accommodating statutes drafted in "di-
verse universes" would undermine such conceptualiztion. See generally note 94 supra.
97 When a transfer takes effect is defined in terms of a negative and a contingency.
At a minimum, effectiveness requires that the debtor have rights in the collateral, H.R.
31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-60 7 (g)(7) (1975), but effectiveness is not dependent on
perfection and may take place prior to perfection. Id. The Act provides no further
definition.
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fer paying or securing." If the definition of antecedence in the
proposed Act is construed as referring to the time a transfer is
perfected, courts might again begin conceptualizing perfection
so as to permit security interests in after-acquired property, even
without an explicit statutory authorization such as section
4-607(d).98 This result would simply make hash of the entire
statutory scheme that 4-607 sets out for the treatment of after-
acquired inventory and receivables. Subsection 4-607(d) states an
exception to the general rule of 4-607(a). The exception says
that certain transfers of a security interest in after-acquired in-
ventory or receivables are not voidable by the transferor's trustee
in bankruptcy, implying that absent such an exception all trans-
fers of this sort would be recoverable by a trustee exercising his
avoidance powers under 4-607(a). This implication, in turn,
makes sense only if all transfers of a security interest in after-
acquired inventory or receivables are transfers for an antecedent
debt.99
The definition of antecedence that best accords with the
policy aims and technical structure of the proposed Act is one
that focuses, in the Act's own language, upon the time at which a
transfer occurs, rather than the time at which it is perfected or
"takes effect" between the parties. In order to make the defini-
9' See note 94 supra & note 99 infra.
9' To make absolutely clear that all conceptual support for floating liens is washed
away, except for the exceptions of § 4-607(d), some commentators may wish to substitute
the following for subsections (g)(6) and (g)( 7 ) and add a subsection (g)(8 ):
4-607(g)(6) A transfer of property occurs (1) when the transfer is perfected and
(2) the transferor has acquired rights in the discrete property which is the
subject of the transfer or in the discrete property a security interest in which is
the subject of the transfer.
(7) A transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the interest of a
seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property, is perfected
when the transferee has acquired an interest in the property which is superior to
and not only equal to the rights a subsequent bona fide purchaser of the prop-
erty from the transferor could subsequently acquire by his purchase. A transfer
of fixtures or of property other than real property is perfected when the trans-
feree has acquired an interest in the property which is superior to and not only
equal to the rights a subsequent judicial lien creditor could acquire in the prop-
erty transferred.
(8) A transfer shall be deemed to have occurred from the time it took effect
between the parties, if perfected within ten days thereafter. Otherwise, a trans-
fer shall not occur until a transfer is perfected. A transfer not perfected before
the filing of the petition dates from a time immediately preceding such filing. A
transfer does not take effect before the transferor has acquired rights in the
property.
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tion of antecedence crystal-clear, and to integrate it better with
the technical vocabulary of section 4-607, the first sentence of
subsection (g)(1) should be redrafted to read:
The term "antecedent debt" means a debt incurred
more than five days before the occurrence of a transfer
paying or securing the debt.
B. The Two-Point "Net Improvement" Test
The debate over the validity in bankruptcy of the Article 9
security interest in after-acquired inventory and receivables has
centered on various technical considerations involving the inter-
related concepts of perfection and antecedence. 100 This profu-
sion of technical arguments has obscured the conflicting material
interests at stake. The conflict, of course, is between the
bankrupt's secured and unsecured creditors. 1 1
A secured party, by definition, wants to be treated as a spe-
cial creditor who is entitled to full satisfaction of his claim out of
the collateral securing it before other creditors, especially unse-
cured creditors, can apply any of this collateral to the satisfaction
of their claims. 10 2 The secured creditor demands privileged
treatment in his debtor's bankruptcy; he insists that the prospect
of privileged status in the awful event of insolvency was one of
the factors inducing him to make his loan in the first place. 10 3
100 See notes 39-62 supra & accompanying text.
101 This conflict has long been at the very center of bankruptcy administration. See 2
GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.2.
"In the structure of the [Bankruptcy Act] there is a sort of built-in tension between
the basic prescription that security rights are to be recognized and the administrative
procedures which insure that they will be recognized to the smallest degree possible." Id.
1287.
102 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504.
103 "The acid test as to the validity of the security interest is its ability to withstand
attack by the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor, because the trustee embodies in his
person the rights of almost everyone who can challenge the validity of a security in-
terest." Coogan & Vagts, The Secured Creditor and the Bankruptcy Act: An Introduction, in 1 P.
COOGAN, W. HOGAN, & D. VAGTS, supra note 49, at 972.
If everything goes well, it turns out that the security was never really
needed, except for the purpose of inducing the creditor to take a chance that
the event proves to have been only imaginary. It is when things go wrong that
the security comes into its own. Any security that will not stand up in case of
insolvency of the debtor is only a trap for the unwary creditor. Of all the tests to
which a security transaction can be put, bankruptcy is the most exacting. This is
as it should be.
MacLachlan, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Secured Transactions, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 608
(1960).
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By contrast, the watchword of the unsecured creditor is
"equality in distribution.' 1 04 The unsecured creditor wants all of
the bankrupt's creditors-whatever their status prior to bank-
ruptcy-to help bear the financial burden of their common
debtor's collapse. Many short-term trade creditors find it dif-
ficult to obtain security for their advances: yet they too have con-
tributed to their debtor's estate. Their claims deserve protection,
especially against the all-devouring after-acquired property
clause which allows a secured party to take a blanket lien on all
of his debtor's future assets and then to sit back, supremely
confident that he will be sitting on a mountain of collateral on
bankruptcy day. 10 5 The trustee, who represents the bankrupt's
unsecured creditors, has the power to avoid certain transfers as
preferential to prevent such inequities and, to the extent that it is
fair and commercially feasible, to advance the Bankruptcy Act's
basic aim of equality in distributing the bankrupt's assets.
Section 4-607(d) 0 6 represents a compromise between these
two positions. It recognizes the validity of security interests in
after-acquired inventory and receivables, but places a limit on
the extent to which such interests will be protected. The trustee
is to determine the value of the collateral securing the debt three
months prior to the date of bankruptcy, or, "if new value was
first given under the security agreement during the three-month
period, on the date new value was first given"; if the debt was
under-collateralized at that time any increase in the value of the
collateral, due to the acquisition by the debtor of new inventory
or receivables, during the period prior to bankruptcy, will consti-
tute a voidable preference recoverable by the trustee acting
under section 4-607(a).
Thus if a debt of $100,000 is secured three months prior to
bankruptcy by inventory worth $75,000, and the value of the
inventory increases during the three-month period to $100,000
at the time the petition is filed, the trustee can retain or recover
104 'Equality is equity' is a beguiling slogan. In the context of bankruptcy pro-
ceeding, ideal equality might seem to lie in having all creditors share equally,
without regard to their pre-bankruptcy status. The Bankruptcy Act did not
go-could not, it may be, constitutionally have gone-that far. Nevertheless,
bankruptcy law has always inclined in that direction.
2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 45.2, at 1287.
105 1970 COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
106 For the text of the section, H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607(d) (1975), see
note 7 supra.
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$25,000 worth of inventory as a preference. If, three months
prior to bankruptcy or at the time during that period when new
value was first given, the value of the collateral equaled or ex-
ceeded the value of the debt that it secured, no preference exists
under this test.107 Fluctuations in the value of the collateral dur-
ing the period between the two temporal points employed by the
section 4-607(d) yardstick, are irrelevant as to whether and to
what extent a preference has been given to the secured party.
If a debt first becomes under-collateralized during this period,
but once again is fully collateralized at the time of bankruptcy,
no voidable preference has been given.
This compromise solution is based on the policy judgment
that the Article 9 floating lien is beneficial in that it makes it
easier and less expensive for a businessman to borrow on his
inventory and receivables. 10 8 The floating lien particularly
benefits the new or under-capitalized business whose available
collateral is likely to consist of "quick" or "current" assets.' 0 9
Furthermore, the floating lien on after-acquired inventory or
receivables is not wholly prejudicial to the debtor's unsecured
creditors. They have a more vital interest than the debtor's se-
cured creditors in the continuing health of the debtor's
business," 0 and the floating lien permits the debtor to obtain
107 The "two-point" measuring test is triggered only when the debt is under-
collateralized at the first of the two temporal points employed by the test.
108 The Gilmore Committee itself characterized the policy underlying the two-point
measuring test as follows:
The policy ... sacrifices a great deal to simplicity of administration. It seeks
to avoid complicated and expensive litigation by focusing the judicial inquiry on
the situation as it existed on the two dates chosen as measuring points. It seeks
to catch in the preference net particularly those situations in which the trans-
feree (as by crash sales of inventory below cost to feed the receivables) has
sought to manipulate the pre-bankruptcy situation to his own advantage. (In the
normal course of a business declining into bankruptcy the position of an inven-
tory or receivables lender, far from improving, will almost certainly deteriorate).
1970 CoMirmNTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16-17.
The Committee stated earlier that the two-point test was designed to implement the
view
that there is no preference, provided that the relevant security agreement has
been properly perfected, so long as the secured party has not improved his
position during the pre-bankruptcy period (or, to state the case the other way
around, so long as there has been no net depletion of the debtor's estate).
1970 COMMitrtrEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 15. In this regard, the Committee apparently
relied on the rationale adopted by the "net result" cases, see note 58 supra.
109 Kripke, supra note 28, at 507; MacLachlan, supra note 103, at 607-08.
110 In the long run (not necessarily in any particular case), the unsecured trade
creditor is benefited by secured credit, because it converts inventory which
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more cheaply the secured credit needed to keep his business
alive during difficult periods.
The floating lien, however, should not receive unlimited
protection. In particular, there are two situations in which a se-
cured party should not be permitted to claim as collateral for
his loan the full value, measured on the date of bankruptcy, of
the inventory or receivables securing it.
First, a secured party obviously should be denied rights in
his collateral to the extent that the value of such collateral in-
creased, during the period immediately preceding bankruptcy,
because of his own fraudulent or manipulative conduct.11 ' A
creditor whose loan is secured by receivables sometimes uses his
power or influence to persuade his debtor to conduct a "fire
sale" of all available inventory at prices well below cost, in order
to "pump" the receivables and thereby swell the value of the
collateral securing his loan. Such a creditor gains an unfair ad-
vantage over the debtor's other creditors, secured as well as un-
secured, and diminishes the total value of the bankrupt's estate.
Conduct of this sort should be discouraged.
Secondly, and not as obviously, a secured party should be
denied the benefit of any "windfall" increase in the value of his
collateral during the immediate pre-bankruptcy period. Such a
windfall could result from an unexpected and extraordinary
flurry of sales which dramatically increased the total value of the
outstanding receivables. Since the secured party did not bargain
for a windfall of this type, he has not given anything to the
debtor's estate, by way of consideration, that might entitle him to
appropriate to himself the entire benefit of the windfall. 1 2 A
windfall increase in the value of the bankrupt's estate should
benefit all creditors equally so that the consequences of the vicis-
situdes of commercial life will be moderated rather than exag-
gerated in bankruptcy.
might not be sold for months and receivables which might not be collected for
months into cash. It enables the debtor to pay his trade credit bills, perhaps to
discount them. Overall, trade creditors are aided although in a particular case
they may be distressed because the dividend in bankruptcy is small.
Krause, Kripke & Seligson, supra note 58, at 287.
1 1970 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 16-17. An increase in the value of the
creditor's collateral, due to conduct of this sort, closely resembles a classical fraudulent
conveyance, which not even the warmest friend of the Article 9 floating lien is likely to
defend. See generally note 4 supra.
112 This conclusion follows as a corollary to the "net result" rule, see note 58 supra.
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The policy of protecting the floating lien on after-acquired
inventory and receivables in all but the two situations just de-
scribed is best served by focusing not on the state of mind of the
secured party, 113 or on the technical chronology of each transfer,
but rather on fluctuation in the overall value of the collateral
securing the floating lien. 1 4 In almost all cases, the total value of
the debtor's inventory and receivables will decline in the period
preceding bankruptcy. 115 When it increases instead, the increase
will almost always be due to manipulative conduct by the secured
party or a windfall outside "the normal course of a business
declining into bankruptcy."
'"1 6
This presumption, like all others, does not hold true in
every case. Weaving the preference net more finely to catch the
distinction between "good" and "bad" increases in the value of
collateral would, however, require refinement of the two-point
net improvement test that would undoubtedly make proving the
existence of a voidable preference more difficult. This difficulty
would increase the likelihood of "tedious, asset-exhausting
litigation"" 7 that would only deplete the estate. In sum, there
must be "a straight policy choice between the rough and ready
provisions of [section 4-607(d)] (which, it is thought, will work
reasonably well in all but the unusual case) and the desire to do
justice case by case."
118
This argument is well put. As the draftsmen themselves
recognized, 19 however, the two-point test embodied in section
4-607(d) would condemn many "improvements of position"
whose increase was due neither to manipulative conduct on the
113 The present Bankruptcy Act focuses on state of mind by making a preferential
transfer voidable by the bankrupt's trustee "if the creditor receiving it or to be benefited
thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when the transfer is
made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent." Section 60b, 11 U.S.C. §
96(b) (1970). For the historical evolution of this aspect of the law of voidable preferences,
see note 4 supra.
114 1967 CorMrrrEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
,,5 1970 CON1MrrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17.
116 Id.
117 
Id.
118 Id.
119 It is easy to state hypothetical (and real) cases in which there has been an
"improvement of position" within the proposed statutory text where there has
been no fraud or manipulation by the transferee-for example, the case of an
agricultural loan where the crop is harvested and processed just before bank-
ruptcy.
Id.
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part of the secured party nor to a windfall gain outside the
normal course of business. Such "improvements" would occur,
for example, in most seasonal industries, in which the volume of
inventory and receivables fluctuates dramatically but regularly
during the course of the business year.1
2 0
Imagine the situation, under section 4-607(d), of a secured
party who makes a loan to a toy manufacturer in November and
takes as collateral the manufacturer's receivables, including those
to arise in the future. When he makes the loan, the secured
party may not be disturbed that his loan is presently under-
collateralized; he anticipates that a rapid but normal expansion
in the volume of his debtor's receivables during the holiday sea-
son will bring the value of the collateral up to the amount of the
loan. The near certainty of such an expansion is part of
the consideration inducing the secured party to make his loan
in the first place. The expansion is not an unanticipated and
unbargained-for windfall.' 12  Nevertheless, when the manufac-
turer files a bankruptcy petition in January, the lender will learn,
much to his dismay, that he has received a voidable preference
which the manufacturer's trustee is empowered to recover for
the benefit of the bankrupt's unsecured creditors.
This result seems unfair and is certainly inconsistent with
120 Professor Hogan has described the special problems that a two-point net im-
provement test poses for seasonal industries:
Although this "two point" method of tracing makes for easier administra-
tion than either precise tracing or revival of the policing techniques of Benedict v.
Ratner, it has a discriminatory premise. Only businesses that have a regular and
constant flow of accounts or inventory can safely be financed within its bound-
aries. If the debtor has fluctuating income, his credit needs will be poorly
served. Farmers may thus have an added obstacle to overcome in obtaining
credit, because their accounts are earned en masse at the end of the growing
season. Other seasonal industries, such as toy manufacturers, suppliers of recre-
ational items, and fashion clothiers, may face this same problem. In addition,
expanding businesses in need of capital will find the preference hurdle in their
path. Each of these cases involves a situation in which, without any scheme to
harm creditors, the value of the accounts may increase during the four months
prior to bankruptcy. And in each case, the secured creditor may have planned
on the rising accounts as collateral without violating any standard of business
morality. If we adopt the "two point" method of tracing as a flat rule, we may
reach a workable compromise between the claims of the secured creditor group
and the bankruptcy bar. But, without any other reason, we will be discriminating
against a substantial number of debtors and their secured creditors.
Hogan, supra note 56, at 564-65. See also Krause, Kripke & Seligson, supra note 58, at
287.
121 Neither is the seasonal expansion the result of fraud or manipulation by the se-
cured party.
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the policy underlying section 4-607(d).122 The two-point net im-
provement test should be modified to avoid the result in this case
without significantly increasing the likelihood of expensive and
time-consuming litigation in cases in which a true preference has
been given and should be set aside.
One new approach would be to state the basic premise of
section 4-607(d) in the form of an explicit but rebuttable pre-
sumption. The premise is, of course, that "[i]n the normal course
of a business declining into bankruptcy the position of an inven-
tory or receivables lender, far from improving, will almost cer-
tainly deteriorate."'123 The trustee would be entitled to rely on
the presumption, but a secured party could rebut it in the un-
usual case in which his improvement in position was entirely
attributable to events occurring in the normal and anticipated
course of his debtor's business.' 24 To this end, section 4-607(d)
might be redrafted in the following manner:
1
2 2 See note 108 supra.
123 1970 COMMITrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 17 (emphasis supplied).
124 The proposed Bankruptcy Act that was introduced in the Canadian House of
Commons on May 5, 1975, Bill C-60, 30th Parl., 1st Sess. 23 & 24 Eliz. 11 (1974-75),
contains a section treating preferences at "arm's length." The section reads as follows:
158. (1) A transfer that is a preference in favour of a creditor at arm's length is
unenforceable against the trustee where the transfer is made
(a) less than six months before the filing of a petition;
(b) when the debtor is insolvent or is unable to pay his debts; and
(c) other than in the normal course of affairs or, to the knowledge of the
creditor, other than in the normal course of the affairs of the debtor.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), a transfer made less than three
months prior to the date of filing of a petition is deemed to have been
made otherwise than in the normal course of affairs unless the contrary is
proved.
In § 2 of the Bill a preference is defined as
a transfer made or allowed by a debtor to, or for the benefit of, a creditor for or
on account of an antecedent debt, the effect of which transfer, if not set aside, is
to allow the creditor to receive a greater percentage of that debt than he would
otherwise receive under this Act ....
The Canadian treatment of the "arm's length" (that is, non-fraudulent) preference is
distinguished by the explicit fashion in which it incorporates the "normal course of
affairs" test that is merely implicit in § 4-607 of the proposed American Act. According to
one of the Canadian draftsmen, "[T~he sections in the Bill relating to voidable prefer-
ences are strongly influenced by the report made by Professor Gilmore's Committee to
the National Bankruptcy Conference." Letter from John Honsberger, Esq., to the au-
thor, June 18, 1975, on file with the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.
In Canada, "floating charges have not been attacked as preferential if the amount of
inventory charged fluctuates during the suspect period." Id. As a result, there was no
perceived need to include in the Canadian Bill a specific section comparable to §
4-607(d). Nevertheless, the idea directly expressed in § 158(2) of the Canadian Bill bears
a strong similarity to the implicit presumption on which § 4-607(d) rests.
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If inventory was acquired or receivables arose and be-
came collateral covered by a security agreement, a per-
fected transfer of such inventory or receivables or the
proceeds of either is not voidable except to the extent
that the transferee has improved his position by an in-
crease in the value of the security at the expense of the
estate. The transferee shall be presumed to have so im-
proved his position at the expense of the estate if:
1) the debt secured exceeds the aggregate value of
all security for the debt three months before the filing
of the petition or, if new value was first given under the
security agreement during the three-month period, on
the date new value was first given; and
2) the amount by which the debt exceeded the
value of the security has been reduced or eliminated by
the date of the petition.
For the secured party, this formulation is more attractive. It
lets him argue that although he has improved his position under
the two-point test, the improvement has not been at the expense
of the estate. In making this argument, however, the secured
party will bear the burden of proof: this burden will help reduce
the incidence of frivilous or pro forma challenges to the trustee's
exercise of his avoiding powers. The trustee's position will be
further enhanced, and litigation reduced, by elimination of the
provision in section 4-607(d)(2), as presently drafted, that "[t]he
trustee shall have the burden of proving an improvement in
position by an increase in the value of security at the expense of
the estate and the extent thereof." The likelihood of litigation in
cases in which a secured party's improvement of position is due
to an unexpected windfall or manipulative conduct would not
seem to be dramatically increased by making the two-point test a
presumption rather than an iron-clad rule.
This formulation of section 4-607(d) has some difficulties.
Perhaps its most important shortcoming is that it is not at all
clear what a secured party would have to establish to overcome
the presumption that he had improved his position at the ex-
pense of the bankrupt's estate. By turning the two-point test into
a presumption, the assumption is introduced that at least some
improvements of position, as defined by the test, are not "at the
expense of the estate." The conclusion required by the policy
underlying section 4-607(d) is that improvements not attribut-
able to a windfall or to manipulation by the secured party, but
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occurring in the ordinary and expected course of the debtor's
business, are not improvements at the expense of the estate.
To reduce this proposition to precise statutory language
would be difficult, however; and such a reduction, even if possi-
ble, might not be desirable. The better approach would be to
leave the question open for judicial consideration on a case-by-
case basis. Although this would stimulate more litigation, at least
initially, than would the hard and fast rule of present section
4-607(d), it is not unreasonable to think that the courts would
quickly isolate a few situations (the seasonal industry, the crop
loan, and so forth) as legitimate exceptions to the general rule
that any improvement of position by an inventory or receivables
lender during the three months prior to bankruptcy is at the
expense of his debtor's estate.
125
A second, but less serious, difficulty with the proposed re-
formulation of section 4-607(d) is that it seems to allow, or at
least not rule out, a trustee's setting aside a perfected transfer,
on the grounds that it improved the position of the transferee at
the expense of the estate, even when the improvement did not
fall within the strictures of the two-point test. This possibility
follows from the fact that the proposed reformulation is cast in
the form of a presumption.126 Thus, nothing in the language of
the reformulation would prevent a trustee from asserting that a
secured debt was under-collateralized four months prior to the
filing of the petition (though it was fully collateralized three
months prior); that the debtor was continuously insolvent for
the four months; and that the improvement was therefore at the
expense of the estate. The three-month period of section (d) is
not a necessary condition, and is independent of the three-
month period of section (a).
Obviously, a line should be drawn somewhere. The
draftsmen of section 4-607(d) have chosen to draw it at a point
125 Obviously, the more flexible we make the test for determining improvement "at
the expense of the estate," the more we stir up additional litigation. So far as the redraft
proposed here is concerned, the costs in added litigation will be high, if at all, only in the
short run. In any case they will be offset by the advantages to be gained from stating the
improvement test as a rebuttable presumption rather than an irrebuttable rule.
126 Logically, this has two consequences: (1) Not all transfers that fall within the
strictures of the two-point test are necessarily preferences; and (2) some transfers that fall
outside the strictures of the two-point test may be considered preferences. The purpose
of the further amendment to § 4-607(d) which is offered above is to rule out the second
result while preserving the first.
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three months before the filing of the petition. Although this line
is an arbitrary one,' 27 it should be respected; the trustee should
not be permitted to set aside a transfer that improved the posi-
tion of a secured creditor at the expense of the bankrupt's estate
as long as the improvement occurred prior to the three-month
period, provided, of course, that the transfer is not otherwise
voidable under section 4-607(a)(2). 128 The small benefit that
would accrue to general creditors from an indefinite period is
overshadowed by the increased uncertainty and risk for secured
creditors and the consequent increased cost of credit. The trus-
tee can be foreclosed from attacking improvements beyond the
three-month limit by the addition of a sentence to the proposed
reformulation of section 4-607(d):
For purposes of this subsection a transferee does not
improve his position at the expense of the estate as a
result of any change in the value of the collateral under
a security agreement if such change occurs more than
three months before the filing of the petition.
C. Improvements Due to Appreciation in Value
What is the proper treatment, in bankruptcy, of improve-
ments in a secured party's position that are attributable not to
the debtor's acquisition of new inventory or receivables, but
rather to an appreciation in the value of collateral in which the
debtor already has rights? This question is obviously related to
the one discussed above, because appreciation in value 129 may be
viewed as a species of after-acquired property. Although the
question has attracted considerable scholarly attention, 13 0 it has
127 In an earlier draft, the line was drawn at four months. The Com-
mittee's comment a propos its choice of a four-month period seems to fit equally well its
final choice of a three-month period:
There is no logical reason why the four-months period should be used for this
purpose instead of a shorter period or a longer one. On the other hand, there is
no reason to believe that a longer or shorter period would better serve the ends
of justice or better promote the underlying policy of the Bankruptcy Act.
1967 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 15.
128 Under the proposed Act, "insiders" could be subjected to odd results as their
"preference period" is one year but their "improvement" period is three months.
129 The expression "appreciation in value" will be used throughout to refer specifi-
cally to any increase in the value of collateral in which the debtor already has rights.
130 See, e.g., Letter from Professor Homer Kripke to the Committee on the Coordina-
tion of the Uniform Commercial Code and the Bankruptcy Act, Sept. 17, 1970, in
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 210; Hogan, supra note 56, at 558-59; Krause,
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provoked almost no litigation. 131 This lack of litigation is rather
puzzling. The question could arise in a variety of perfectly
routine, real-world situations, for example, when the market
value of inventory securing a debt increases rapidly during the
immediate pre-bankruptcy period, or when the value of raw
materials securing a debt increases during a process of manufac-
ture or assembly.
Despite the fact that the question has so far remained an
academic one, the draftsmen of section 4-607 attempted at first
Kripke & Seligson, supra note 58, at 290; Note, After-Acquired Property Security Interests in
Bankruptcy: A Substitution of Collateral Defense of the UCC, 77 YALE L.J. 139, 153 (1967).
131 In his letter to the Gilmore Committee, supra note 130, Professor Kripke cites the
case of Meinhard, Greeff & Co. v. Edens, 189 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1951), as a model for
the proper treatment in bankruptcy of appreciation value due to completion of work in
process. Meinhard involved the reorganization of a corporation under Chapter X of the
Bankruptcy Act. The corporation, a manufacturer of cotton textile, borrowed money
from Meinhard, Greeff & Co., a textile factor. As security for its loan, Meinhard took a
lien, under the South Carolina Factor's Lien Act, "upon the merchandise and accounts
receivable of [the] debtor including all cotton and cotton yarn in process of manufac-
ture." Id. at 796. When the corporation's petition for reorganization was filed, a quantity
of its cotton was in the course of manufacture. The reorganization court ordered the
corporation's trustees to finish the cotton and sell it, which they did. The cotton was sold
for $71,254.65. The cost incurred by the trustees in completing its manufacture was
$25,106.99. The referee assuming the cotton in process had only waste value, held that
the trustees and Meinhard had become joint venturers in the continued operation of the
mill. He then awarded Meinhard half the difference between sale price and "fully allo-
cated" costs, only $14,031.20. The Fourth Circuit rejected this theory and held for
Meinhard:
Expenditures made by the trustees in completing the manufacture were, of
course, properly chargeable against the product; but there is nothing in law or
in reason to justify treating the yarn in process as waste and the amount received
for it when the manufacturing process was completed as profit resulting from
the manufacture. It was not waste if the claimant was entitled to have the
manufacture go forward, and claimant was entitled to this if the mills were
operated under order of court, since it was the duty of the court to protect the
rights of all persons having interests in the property, not merely the interests of
the debtor or general creditors. If the debtor had continued the operation of the
mills, the entire proceeds of the yarn would have been subject to claimant's lien.
When the trustees continued the operation and took over the yarn, they did so
subject to claimant's rights and may not charge against the proceeds anything in
excess of the expenditures properly attributable to completing the manufacture.
Id. at 796-97.
Professor Kripke acknowledged thatMeinhard was concerned with an appreciation in
value that occurred after the filing of the petition (and, it should be noted, in a reorgani-
zation proceeding), but suggested that the Meinhard rule would be equally applicable
when the secured party's improvement in position occurred before the petition was filed
(and when the debtor's estate was being liquidated rather than rehabilitated).
That Professor Kripke had to go so far afield to find case support for his position is
itself evidence of the meagerness of litigation concerning the proper bankruptcy treat-
ment of appreciation value.
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to answer it.a32 Their answer was contained in a separate section
of the 1967 proposed redraft of section 60,133 which was subse-
quently eliminated. 134 That section provided, in essence, that any
increase during the pre-petition period in the value of collateral,
in which there was a perfected security interest, does not consti-
tute a preference, if the increase in the value of the collateral was
due to:
(1) fluctuating market values; or
(2) the conversion of inventory or other property into
receivables by disposition of the property by the
debtor in the ordinary course of his business; or
(3) the manufacture or assembly of raw materials, work
in progress or component parts into a product, ex-
cept to the extent that property not subject to the
security agreement was, during the four month
period, incorporated in the product.
35
Apparently, the committee's initial view was that an im-
provement in the position of a secured party due to appreciation
in the value of his collateral should be treated more favorably in
bankruptcy than a comparable improvement due to acquisition
by the debtor of new inventory or receivables. Appreciation in
value was to be insulated from attack by the trustee, while im-
provement by acquisition was to be stigmatized as preferential to
the extent that it ran afoul of the two-point net improvement
test. 136 The committee seems to have believed, early in its delib-
erations, that this special treatment of appreciation value was
"consistent with what scattered case law there is,"'1 37 and har-
monized well with the Article 9 provisions concerning security
interests in "proceeds," 138 accessions, and processed or manufac-
112 1967 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18-19.
1
33 
Id.
134 1970 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 18. The Committee's reversal of posi-
tion, between 1967 and 1970, is most dramatically evidenced by its changing attitude
toward the holding in Rockmore v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317
U.S. 700 (1943). In 1967, the Committee felt that its position codified the holding in that
case. 1967 COMMiTTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16. By 1970, however, the Committee
admitted that its new position with respect to the treatment of appreciation value may
have overruled Rockmore. 1970 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 18.
135 1967 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
136 See notes 79-86 supra & accompanying text.
137 1967 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 18.
138 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-306. Although the draft of the revision of § 60
adopted the rule that "a change in the form of collateral (as when inventory is converted
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tured goods. 1
39
The Committee ultimately reversed itself and eliminated the
original provision protecting improvements of position due to
appreciation in the value of collateral. Improvements of this type
are accorded a distinctly unfavorable treatment under proposed
section 4-607 and under the revised 1970 draft upon which the
section is based. Any improvement in the secured party's posi-
tion due to appreciation in the value of his collateral would pre-
sumably be vulnerable under section 4-607(a), 140 and the ap-
preciation would receive protection from the section 4-607(d)
exception only if the collateral is inventory that has been "ac-
quired" or receivables that have "arisen" or proceeds therefrom,
and even then only to the extent such improvement was not at
the expense of the estate as defined or presumed by the Act.
That this result was a deliberate one is shown by the following
hypothetical posed by the Committee in its 1970 report to the
Bankruptcy Conference:
into receivables) is not necessarily preferential even when the result of the conversion is
an increase in value," it did not take an explicit position "on the validity in bankruptcy
proceedings of [Uniform Commercial] Code § 9-306(4)." 1967 COMMITrEE REPORT, supra
note 8, at 18. The draftsmen noted that
The validity of this Code provision (like that of its predecessor, § 10 of the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act) has been a matter of some controversy. The failure
of the Draft to take a position merely reflects the fact that the Committee has
not yet considered whether it would be desirable to add a provision to deal with
the § 9-306(4) problem.
Id. 18-19. For articles on the bankruptcy treatment of the Article 9 security interest in
proceeds, see note 12 supra.
'39 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-314, 9-315. In pertinent part, § 9-315(1) now
states:
If a security interest in goods was perfected and subsequently the goods or a
part thereof have become part of a product or mass, the security interest con-
tinues in the product or mass if
(a) the goods are so manufactured, processed, assembled or commingled
that their identity is lost in the product or mass; or
(b) a financing statement covering the original goods also covers the
product into which the goods have been manufactured, processed, or
assembled.
140 The security interest consists of a bundle of rights including contingent interests
defined by the value of the subject matter of the interest. If the value changes, different
interests, by definition, emerge. Unless a new entity theory is invoked, cf. notes 56 & 57
supra & accompanying text, the debtor has rights in the appreciated portion of the
property only when appreciation actually takes place. The transfer of the security interest
including those rights can only "occur," for purposes of the proposed Act, when appreci-
ation takes place. See notes 86-94 supra & accompanying text. Therefore, any increment
in value of the subject matter of a security interest will be a transfer for antecedent debt
and may be vulnerable to avoidance under § 4-607(a).
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Let it be assumed that a secured party's collateral four
months before bankruptcy consists of raw materials
worth $10,000. On the date the bankruptcy petition is
filed the raw materials have been converted into
finished products worth $20,000. (Under Code 9-315
the security interest in the raw materials carries through
to the finished product.) Assuming an initial "defi-
ciency" (the debt secured, let us assume, was at all times
$25,000), the $10,000 increase in value is not protected
under sub-paragraph IV [current subsection (d)] and
goes to the trustee.
141
Unfortunately, the reasons for this dramatic reversal in the
Committee's position do not appear anywhere in its report, and
we are left to speculate about the Committee's motives.' 42 Mat-
ters are made even worse by the official Commission commen-
tary on the proposed revision of section 60, which suggests that
section 4-607(d) is, in effect, to be read as embodying the Com-
mittee's original view that improvements due to appreciation
should be treated more favorably than those due to the acquisi-
tion of new collateral. With regard to the section 4-607(d) net
improvement test, the Commission commented:
Improvement in position is alone not enough. The
trustee must also establish that the improvement was at
the expense of the estate. This is intended partially to
meet Professor Kripke's criticism that increases in value
of collateral due to, e.g., harvesting crops, completing
work in progress, sales of inventory, and seasonal fluc-
tuations in value, would constitute improvement in posi-
tion and be recoverable.
43
"At the expense of the estate" is to be construed, according
to the Commission, as imposing an additional element of proof
upon the trustee which will have the effect of insulating from
attack as a preference any improvement in the position of a se-
cured creditor due to appreciation in the value of already exist-
141 1970 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 18.
142 It is Professor Gilmore's recollection that the Committee's decision to drop the
section that explicitly outlined the treatment of appreciation value was based upon a
feeling that as the question had not come up in litigation, the best policy was to let
"sleeping dogs lie" by not creating a legal problem that did not yet exist. Interview with
Professor Gilmore in New Haven, Connecticut, Apr. 16, 1975.
143 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 3, at 209-10.
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ing collateral (whether through manufacture, transformation
into "proceeds," or fluctuating market prices), despite the fact
that the improvement would otherwise be voidable under the
two-point test.
The Commission's suggested reading of section 4-607(d)
leaves the proposed treatment of appreciation value in bank-
ruptcy proceedings in a state of intolerable confusion. A clear
solution to the problem of appreciation value is required. In
seeking such a solution, we should begin by asking why an im-
provement in the position of a secured creditor, wholly attribut-
able to an increase in the value of his collateral during the period
immediately preceding bankruptcy, should be protected from
attack by his debtor's trustee.
The real goal of the section 4-607(d) two-point net im-
provement test is to facilitate the recovery, by the trustee, of
benefits flowing to secured creditors as a result either of unan-
ticipated windfall gains or the creditors' own manipulative
conduct. 144 The test assumes that any improvement in a secured
creditor's position during the immediate pre-bankruptcy period
will be inconsistent with the normal course of a business declin-
ing into insolvency and, therefore, attributable in all likelihood
to one of these two causes.
By implication, an improvement due to an event or events
within the normal and expected course of the debtor's business
should not be stigmatized as preferential. It is reasonable to as-
sume that the certain or near-certain prospect of such an im-
provement constituted part of the consideration inducing the se-
cured party to make his loan or to set its terms as he did. The
secured party may be assumed to have given something to his
debtor's estate in exchange for the high probability that the
value of his collateral would increase in the normal course of his
debtor's business. This distinguishes the situation from a wind-
fall gain, for which the secured party has given nothing. The
logic of this argument applies equally to increases flowing from
the debtor's acquisition of new collateral and to appreciation
in the value of collateral already held by the debtor.
Consider the following example. On November 1, a bank
lends $100,000 to a manufacturer of cotton thread and perfects
a security interest in the manufacturer's inventory on the same
144 Notes 108-112 supra & accompanying text.
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date.145 When the loan is made the inventory consists entirely of
raw, unprocessed cotton worth $50,000. By December 1, the raw
cotton has been worked into finished thread whose value is
$175,000. No competing security interests exist in the finished
thread.146 Before selling the thread, the manufacturer is
petitioned into bankruptcy. 47 The bank enters a secured claim
for $100,000; the bankrupt's trustee seeks to avoid this claim to
the extent of $50,000, which he claims is a voidable preference.
The increase in the value of the inventory securing the loan
probably does not represent an unanticipated windfall benefit to
the bank. The bank undoubtedly expected that the raw cotton
which secured its loan would soon be processed into finished
thread, in the normal course of the debtor's business, and that as
a result it would increase in value. Otherwise the bank might
very well have refused to make the loan at all, especially if the
debtor lacked other collateral sufficient to secure its debt. The
manufacturer needed $100,000 on November 1 to complete the
processing of his raw cotton. His short-term trade creditors be-
nefited from the loan.148 The manufacturer's trustee in bank-
ruptcy should not be permitted to treat the bank's improvement
in position as a windfall benefit reaped at the expense of the
manufacturer's unsecured creditors.
Not all improvements of position due to appreciation in the
value of collateral should be treated alike. An improvement that
results from an unbargained-for windfall should be stigmatized
as preferential; one that results from a routine and expected
increase in value should be insulated from attack by the trustee.
This conclusion accords with the policy underlying section
4-607(d)'s proposed treatment of security interests in after-
acquired inventory and receivables.
Of the three types of appreciation value treated in the
Committee's original draft proposal,' 49 only' one-appreciation
145 He perfects his security interest by filing a financing statement as required by
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302.
146 If others existed, the priority among them would be fixed according to UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-315(2):
When under subsection (1) more than one security interest attaches to the pro-
duct or mass, they rank equally according to the ratio that the cost of the goods
to which each interest originally attached bears to the cost of the total product or
mass.
147 See § 3b of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 2 l(b) (1970).
146 See note 110 supra.
149 See text accompanying note 135 supra.
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due to "the manufacture or assembly of raw materials, work in
progress," and so forth-appears to fall clearly within the cate-
gory deserving insulation from attack. 150 Appreciation because
of "fluctuating market values" or "the conversion of inventory or
other property into receivables" presents a more ambiguous
case,15' and may fall in either category, depending, for example,
upon whether the market fluctuation is seasonal and predictable
or irregular and unanticipated.
Taking into consideration difficulties of proof and the gen-
eral goal of streamlining bankruptcy litigation, 52 a fair com-
promise might be to protect, without qualification, any apprecia-
tion in the value of collateral due to its manufacture or assembly,
but to give the trustee the advantage of a presumption that any
appreciation due to fluctuating market values or the conversion
of inventory into "proceeds" is "at the expense of the estate" and
hence recoverable. 15 3 This would constitute a clear and equitable
treatment of appreciation value in bankruptcy proceedings. To
achieve this result, an additional subsection should be added to
section 4-607, which would read as follows:
Although property transferred for security increases in
value during the three months before the filing of the
petition initiating a proceeding under this Act, such a
transfer is not voidable, provided it was perfected either
before the beginning of the three-month period or at
the time of the transfer of the property, except to
the extent that the increase in value is at the expense
of the estate. Such an increase shall be presumed to be
at the expense of the estate if it is the result of
(1) fluctuating market values; or
(2) the conversion of inventory or other property into
receivables by disposition of the property by the debtor
in the ordinary course of his business.
"I Appreciation of this sort is quite regular and may be predicted in advance. It
therefore seems reasonable to assume that it constitutes part of the consideration induc-
ing a secured party to make his loan on the specific terms that he does, inducing him, for
example, to give a more favorable credit term or a lower interest rate than he otherwise
might.
151 These cases are more ambiguous because the appreciation involved is usually less
predictable and therefore less likely to have been within the contemplation of the parties
at the time they negotiated the loan.
152 Cf. note 108 supra.
'5 Of course, all the other elements of a preference must also be present.
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An increase in the value of property transferred for se-
curity is not at the expense of the estate if it is the result
of
(1) the manufacture or assembly of raw materials, work
in progress, or component parts into a product.
As with the modification of section 4-607(d), this proposal
does not fully define "at the expense of the estate" and leaves the
phrase's definition to case-by-case consideration. The category of
increases at the expense of the estate does not include all in-
creases that would benefit the estate if set aside. This negative
implication may be drawn from the section's last sentence, which
deems as not "at the expense" appreciation by manufacture of
the subject matter of the secured interest. Nor is the phrase
restricted to the value of assets originally part of the estate and
free and clear of the security interest, as the presumption against
fluctuating market prices demonstrates.
D. Section 4-607 and the Corporate Indenture
Corporate bonds and debentures are typically issued under
an indenture of trust which contains a clause providing that
certain specified types of after-acquired property are to be sub-
jected to the mortgage securing the bonds or debentures in
question. 154 In the past, long-term corporate debt invariably was
secured by the corporation's fixed or long-term assets, such as its
equipment or the securities of another corporation. As a rule,
"quick" or "current" corporate assets, such as inventory and re-
ceivables, were used as collateral in short-term financings
only. 1
55
154 H. GUTHMANN AND H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POuCY 183-86 (4th ed.
1962). See generally Coogan & Bok, The Impact of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code on
the Corporate Indenture, 69 YALE L.J. 203 (1959).
15- Professor Gilmore attributes this phenomenon to the application of the rule of
Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925):
The complexities of complying with the Benedict rule made receivables the most
inappropriate of collateral for bonds issued under a trust indenture. Inclusion
of the receivables, indeed, was not merely inappropriate but dangerous: one
aspect of the Benedict rule was that if there was a failure of compliance with
respect to a part of the collateral, the result was to void the transaction with
respect to all the collateral. In the pre-Benedict cases, it is not uncommon to find
provisions in corporate indentures under which the security reserved for the
bonds included the receivables as well as the fixed assets such as plant and
equipment. After Benedict such inclusion could well have been fatal. Thus
another aspect of the "professionalization" which resulted from Benedict was that
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Article 9, by repealing the rule of Benedict v. Ratner,156 has
apparently removed the main reason for segregating the collat-
eral pools for long- and short-term financings, as corporations
have done for the last half century. More importantly, Article 9
offers no grounds for believing that an after-acquired security
interest in a long-term asset, such as a large and relatively im-
mobile piece of industrial machinery, is any more or less vulner-
able to attack as a voidable preference under present section 60
of the Bankruptcy Act than an after-acquired security interest in
inventory or receivables. Neither Article 9 nor the present Bank-
ruptcy Act distinguishes between types of after-acquired prop-
erty in terms of the long- or short-term nature of the property
involved. Admittedly, all the cases holding the properly per-
fected transfer of an Article 9 security interest in after-acquired
property to be non-preferential under section 60 involved either
inventory or receivables. No consideration of logic or policy,
however, would bar the extension of these holdings, especially
that of DuBay v. Williams,'5 7 to a case involving a security interest
in industrial machinery or other long-term assets when the in-
terest attached under the after-acquired property clause in a
corporate indenture. A security interest of this kind should easily
survive any post-DuBay challenges as a voidable preference under
section 60.
Under section 4-607 of the proposed Act, however, the
status of a security interest in after-acquired property other than
inventory or receivables is, to say the least, uncertain. 158 Assume,
for example, that corporation ABC issues a series of bond se-
cured by a mortgage on all of the corporation's industrial
equipment, including any that may be acquired after issuance of
receivables, like inventory, were divorced from long-term financing of the cor-
porate indenture type and became a domain reserved for specialists.
1 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 8.1, at 253. See note 27 supra.
156 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-205, Comment 1.
157 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969). For a discussion of DuBay, see note 69 supra.
158 This appears to have been recognized by the draftsmen:
[U]nder the Draft after-acquired property interests in collateral other than in-
ventory and receivables would be subject to avoidance as preferential unless the
secured party gave new value at the time of the acquisition or made an enabling
advance .... No doubt further thought should be given to the problem of
regular course of business acquisitions by a corporation which has issued bonds
or debentures under an indenture of trust which contains an after-acquired
property clause.
1967 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 17.
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the bonds, and that counsel for the corporation and the inden-
ture trustee make a proper Article 9 filing. One year later,
ABC acquires a new machine, which immediately becomes sub-
ject to the mortgage securing the bonds. Two months after ac-
quiring the machine, ABC is petitioned into bankruptcy. The
trustee asserts that the bondholders' security interest in the
after-acquired machine constitutes a voidable preference, which
should be set aside in favor of ABC's trade creditors and stock-
holders.
The bondholder's security interest in the after-acquired
machine was given by ABC in satisfaction of an antecedent
debt.159 Because the transfer occurred within three months of
ABC's bankruptcy and, let us assume, while ABC was insolvent, it
may be avoided by a trustee exercising his general power of
recovery under section 4-607(a), unless it falls within one of the
exceptions enumerated in subsections (b), (c) or (d).
On its face, section 4-607(b) 16 0 does not appear to be rele-
vant. Section 4-607(c)1 6 ' might provide some protection for the
bondholders if they could convince the referee that the money
ABC acquired when it originally sold its bonds was intended to
be applied to the purchase of new machinery, including the par-
ticular machine involved here. This would be difficult to prove.
Unless the bondholders could trace the expenditure of the
money (even though section 4-60 7 (c) does not actually impose a
tracing requirement), 62 they probably would be unable to over-
come the trustee's predictable assertion that the money was not
given to enable ABC to purchase new machinery, but rather to
159 See notes 95-99 supra & accompanying text.
160 For the text of H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607(b), see note 7 supra.
1 For the text of H.R. 31, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4-607(c), see note 7 supra.
162 In this respect, § 4-607(c) differs from the definition of a "purchase money
security interest" in § 9-107 of the Uniform Commercial Code. In commenting on the
predecessor of present § 4-607(c), the Gilmore Committee stated that:
[T]his provision is somewhat broader than the Code definition of "purchase
money security interest" (§ 9-107) which, with respect to purchase money in-
terests taken by lenders (as distinguished from sellers), requires not only that the
new value be given to enable the acquisition but that the value "be in fact so
used". In the Committee's opinion, no useful purpose would be served, in the
context of § 60, by maintaining the tracing requirement which is inherent in the
Code "in fact so used" provision. To entitle the transferee to the protection
given new value financing, it seems sufficient to require a showing that the
advance was made as an enabling advance and that the acquisition of the prop-
erty followed within a reasonable time.
1967 CoNMuTTEE REPORT, supra note 8, at 14.
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finance an entirely new venture or to liquidate old debts. At best,
the bondholders are likely to find the going under section
4-607(c) rather rugged.
Section 4-607(d) offers no relief either as it applies only to
receivables and inventory. Indeed, the trustee could argue, with
some plausibility, that because the section 4-607(d) exception is
specifically limited to these two kinds of after-acquired property,
the draftsmen obviously intended to make all other kinds subject
to the general rule stated in section 4-607(a).
ABC's bondholders do not fit within any of the explicit
statutory exceptions; consequently, their best (or only) defense
may be to employ one or another common law theory to argue
that despite what section 4-607 says, their security interest in the
after-acquired machine was not transferred for an antecedent
debt at all. They could use either the "entity" theory, 163 claiming
that the transfer really occurred when the original debt was in-
curred; or the "substitution of collateral" theory, 64 claiming that
the debt was really incurred when the transfer of the after-
acquired property took place. Neither theory is appropriate in
the context of the proposed Act. 165 The entity theory, positing as
it does a constant stream of similar items, is particularly
inappropriate. 66 Presumably, ABC acquires new machines (as
long as it is not in the business of selling them) only at irregular
intervals. There is no reason to believe that ABC sells its old
machines, if it sells them at all, at or about the time it acquires
new ones. The entity theory cannot be made to fit the factual
pattern prevalent in the acquisition of long-term assets. Neither
this theory nor the substitution of collateral theory can be exp-
loited by ABC's bondholders to support the assertion that their
interest in ABC's new machine is non-preferential.
If the proposed revision of section 60 is enacted, security
interests in after-acquired corporate assets other than inventory
and receivables will be vulnerable to attack as preferential trans-
fers. This result, which would reverse the treatment of such
interests under the present version of section 60, is undesirable.
Of course, a security interest in an after-acquired long-term asset
should be voidable to the extent that it results from a windfall
M See notes 56 & 57 supra & accompanying text.
164 See note 58 supra & accompanying text.
16 See note 94 supra.
166 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 678, 697 (1968).
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gain or manipulative conduct by the secured party-for the same
reasons, and only the same reasons, that a similar security in-
terest in receivables or inventory should be voidable. "Windfall"
might be given a more expansive meaning in this context, to
include acquisitions made in connection with new ventures or
capital expansions that depart from the ordinary course of the
debtor-corporation's business as it existed when the bonds were
originally issued. In general, however, an "ordinary course of
business test" which makes sense and seems fair in the case of
inventory and receivables, should be applied to the kind of
long-term assets that frequently secure corporate obligations.
After-acquired security interests in long- and short-term as-
sets should be treated equally. If section 4-607 is enacted in its
present form, it may upset established and desirable patterns of
corporate financing. This result can be avoided, and long-term
assets put on a par with inventory and receivables, by redrafting
the first sentence of section 4-607(d) as follows:
(d) EXCEPTION: AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY. If prop-
erty was acquired by the debtor and became collateral
covered by a security agreement, a perfected transfer of
such property or the proceeds thereof is not voidable
except to the extent that the transferee has improved
his position by an increase in the value of the security at
the expense of the estate.
III. CONCLUSION
Section 4-607 of the proposed Bankruptcy Act attempts to
provide a simple, yet fair, framework for determining the valid-
ity, in bankruptcy proceedings, of security interests in after-
acquired property. Because this was the "most difficult problem
which the [drafting] Committee . . . wrestled with during the
several years of its labors,"'167 it ought not to come as a surprise,
nor to be a cause for rebuke, that the attempt has been less than
wholly successful.
This Article has suggested four specific ways in which sec-
tion 4-607 may be improved: (1) sections 4 -60 7 (g)(1), (6), and (7)
should be redrafted to make clear that the transfer of a security
167 1970 CommrrrEE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY
interest in after-acquired inventory or receivables is a transfer
for antecedent debt, recoverable by a trustee acting under sec-
tion 4-607(a); (2) section 4-607(d) should be redrafted to state its
underlying premise in the form of an explicit presumption
against improvements in position, rebuttable in the unusual case
in which a secured party's improvement in position is entirely
attributable to events occurring in the normal and anticipated
course of his debtor's business; (3) a new subsection should be
added to section 4-607 which explicitly deals with the treatment
of appreciation value, that is, with improvements in the position
of a secured party due not to the debtor's acquisition of fresh
inventory or receivables, but rather to an increase in the value of
collateral in which the debtor already has rights; and (4) section
4-607(d) should be redrafted to ensure equal treatment of long-
and short-term assets.
These changes would not alter dramatically the main policy
or conceptual structure of section 4-607. They would, however,
remove residual inequities and help clarify the general principle
that informs, or ought to inform, the law of voidable preferences
as it applies to security interests in after-acquired property.
To conclude, let us restate this principle: The transfer of a
security interest in after-acquired property, made within some
fixed period immediately preceding bankruptcy and while the
debtor is insolvent, ought to be voidable if it is the result of a
windfall gain or of overreaching on the part of the secured
party. The secured party has contributed nothing to the estate
entitling him alone to appropriate the benefit of a windfall, and
he should not be permitted to profit from an act of wrongdoing
that depletes the debtor's estate. It is a fair presumption, but
only a presumption, that any increase in the value of the collat-
eral that occurs during the period immediately preceding bank-
ruptcy is due to one of these two causes. An improvement in the
position of a secured party that results from an increase in the
value of his collateral during this period should therefore be
presumed, with certain specific exceptions, to be a preference.
Unless the secured party can demonstrate that his improved pos-
ition is not attributable to a windfall or to overreaching, but to
events wholly within the ordinary course of his debtor's business,
the improvement should be recoverable by his debtor's trustee in
bankruptcy.
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This basic idea is implicit in the net improvement test of
section 4-607(d). 168 The changes recommended here make the
idea explicit and attempt to apply it throughout the range of
problems that section 4-607(d) purports to cover. If these
changes represent an improvement, it is not because consistency
is a virtue in itself, but because the underlying idea is a good
one.
1
68 See note 108 supra.
